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Since the Supreme Court's decision in Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp.,' holding the Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment statute uncon-
stitutional, courts2  and commentators3  have extensively considered
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington University. A.B., 1966, Grinnell Col-
lege; J.D., 1969, University of Texas. I wish to thank Richard A. Mueller, student at
Washington University, for his research assistance and Professors Patrick J. Kelley and
Jules B. Gerard and Dean Edward T. Foote, all of Washington University, for their
extremely helpful suggestions.
1. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
2. E.g., North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975);
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009
(1974); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'1 Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974); Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 487 F.2d
378 (2d Cir. 1973); Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972); Lebowitz v. Forbes
Leasing & Fin. Corp., 456 F.2d 979 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972); Klim
v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d
536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924 (1972); Blair
v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971); Jones Press, Inc.
v. Motor Travel Servs., Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 173 N.W.2d 87 (1970).
3. Under just the heading of "Due Process of Law," the Index to Legal Period-
icals contains well over 100 entries on the subject. Among the most prominent works
are Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights: An Essay
on the Fourteenth Amendment (pts. 1-3), 46 S. CAL. L Rv. 1003, 47 S. CAL. L. REv.
1 (1973); Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the
Constitution, 59 VA. L. REv. 355 (1973); Countryman, The Bill of Rights and the Bill
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constitutional limitations on creditors' prejudgment remedies. Consti-
tutional limitations on postjudgment remedies, however, have received
scant attention4 even though statutes in every state specify property
Collector, 15 ARuz. L. REV. 521 (1973); Kennedy, Due Process Limitations on Cred-
itors' Remedies: Some Reflections on Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 19 AM. U.L.
REv. 158 (1970); Neth, Repossession of Consumer Goods: Due Process for the Con-
sumer: What's Due for the Creditor, 24 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 7 (1972); White, The
Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The Poor Pay Even More, 1973 Wis. L. REV.
503; Williams, Creditors' Prejudgment Remedies: Expanding Strictures on Traditional
Rights, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 60 (1972); Note, Garnishment of Wages Prior to Judgment
Is a Denial of Due Process: The Sniadach Case and Its Implications for Related Areas
of the Law, 68 MIcH. L. RFv. 986 (1970); Note, Provisional Remedies and Due Process
in Default-Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 653.
4. The problem has been considered by Countryman, supra note 3, at 543-45;
Dunham, Post-Judgment Seizures: Does Due Process Require Notice and Hearing?, 21
S. DAY. L. REv. 78 (1976); Kennedy, supra note 3, at 173-76; Levy, Attachment, Gar-
nishment and Garnishment Execution: Some American Problems Considered in the
Light of the English Experience, 5 CONN. L RV. 399, 434-38 (1973); Note, Debtor-
Creditor Relations: Oklahoma Execution Procedure: Is a Warrant Required Before
Levy?, 28 OKLA. L. RV. 864 (1975); Comment, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 626 (1975).
Only seven cases were found in which the courts gave serious consideration to the con-
stitutionality of execution statutes: Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., 392 F. Supp. 1023
(M.D. Fla. 1974), noted in Comment, supra; Halpern v. Austin, 385 F. Supp. 1009
(N.D. Ga. 1974) (three-judge court); Phillips v. Bartolomie, 46 Cal. App. 3d 346, 121
Cal. Rptr. 56 (1975); Raigoza v. Sped, 34 Cal. App. 3d 560, 110 Cal. Rptr. 296 (1973);
Taylor v. Madigan, Civil No. 443647 (Cal. Super. Ct., Aug. 21, 1974), rev'd, 53 Cal.
App. 3d 943, 126 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1975); Mathis v. Purdy, 40 Fla. Supp. 17 (Dade
County Cir. Ct. 1973); Luskey v. Steffron, Inc., - Pa. -, 336 A.2d 298 (1975). Five
others have held unconstitutional the incarceration of a person without prior opportunity
to be heard in connection with the enforcement of civil judgments: Abbit v. Bernier,
387 F. Supp. 57 (D. Conn. 1974) (denial of equal protection); Desmond v. Hachey,
315 F. Supp. 328 (D. Me. 1970); Yoder v. County of Cumberland, 278 A.2d 379 (Me.
1971); Mills v. Howard, 109 R.I. 25, 280 A.2d 101 (1971); Randall v. Randall, 129
Vt. 432, 282 A.2d 794 (1971); cf. Vail v. Quinlan, 406 F. Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(three-judge court). In twelve other cases the courts gave short shrift to claims
that the procedures violated the due process clause: Langford v. Tennessee, 356
F. Supp. 1163 (W.D. Tenn. 1973); Moya v. DeBaca, 286 F. Supp. 606 (D.N.M. 1968),
appeal dismissed, 395 U.S. 825 (1969); Sackin v. Kersting, 105 Ariz. 464, 466 P.2d 758
(1970); Knight v. DeMarcus, 102 Ariz. 105, 425 P.2d 837, cert. granted sub non. Han-
ner v. DeMarcus, 389 U.S. 926 (1967), writ dismissed as improvidently granted, 390
U.S. 736 (1968); Wilson v. Grimes, 232 Ga. 388, 207 S.E.2d 5 (1974); Wood v. Atkin-
son, 231 Ga. 271, 201 S.E.2d 394 (1973), appeal dismissed, 416 U.S. 901 (1974); Cho-
nowski v. Bonucci, 47 Ill. 2d 519, 267 N.E.2d 671 (1971); Credit Serv. Co. v. Linne-
rooth, 290 Minn. 256, 187 N.W.2d 632 (1971); Bittner v. Butts, 514 S.W.2d 556 (Mo.
1974); Hehr v. Tucker, 256 Ore. 254, 472 P.2d 797 (1970); Lenske v. Shobe, 6 Ore.
App. 472, 488 P.2d 852 (1971); Milne v. Shell Oil Co., 129 Vt. 375, 278 A.2d 741
(1971). See also Scott v. Danaher, 343 F. Supp. 1272 (N.D. Ill. 1972), noted in note
53 infra; Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Nune, Civil No. C277480 (Ariz. Super. Ct., filed
Oct. 31, 1975), reported in 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 561 (1975), settled before trial (let-
ter from plaintiff's attorney, on file with author).
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exempt from execution.5 The rationale for exempting property is to
permit the judgment debtor (and his family)6 to maintain a minimum
standard of living and continue as a productive member of society. 7 To
achieve this goal, the substantive provisions of exemption laws are to
be liberally construed.8 But the procedural aspects of exemption laws
may actually frustrate their policy. In addition, they may be unconsti-
tutional. This Article will (1) examine whether, under Sniadach and
other decisions,9 the procedural aspects of existing statutes conform to
the requirements of due process and (2) propose a postjudgment sei-
zure statute that poses no constitutional objections and fairly accommo-
dates the interests of debtor and creditor.'0
5. For a description of these statutes, see text accompanying notes 13-33 infra.
6. Thus exemptions generally are greater for judgment debtors who are heads of
families. See Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights, 62 GEo. L.J. 779, 841-45 (1974).
7. "The purpose of the exemption laws is to prevent the unfortunate citizen from
being deprived of the necessaries of life and to preserve for him and his family certain
things reasonably necessary to enable him to earn a livelihood . . . ." Patten Package
Co. v. Houser, 102 Fla. 603, 606-07, 136 So. 353, 355 (1931); accord, Shepard v. Findly,
204 Iowa 107, 214 N.W. 676 (1927). See generally Vukowich, supra note 6, at 782-
88. Many states impose a limit on the value of property that may be claimed as exempt.
E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 625 (1960) (homestead, $2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37
(13) (Supp. 1975) (wages, 75 percent).
8. Haswell v. Parsons, 15 Cal. 266 (1860) (rejecting what the court described as
"a very narrow construction of the statute"); Independence Bank v. Heller, 275 Cal.
App. 2d 84, 88, 79 Cal. Rptr. 868, 871 (1969) ("It is the universal rule that exemption
statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the debtor"); Shepard v. Findly, 204
Iowa 107, 111, 214 N.W. 676, 678 (1927) ("It is the general rule in this state that the
exemption laws shall be liberally construed in favor of a debtor").
9. E.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976); North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Hanner v. DeMarcus, 390 U.S. 736, 736 (1968) (Douglas,
J., dissenting); Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1946).
10. No consideration will be given to the kinds or amount of property that ought
to be exempt. See S. ENZER, R. DE BluoARD, & F. .AzAi;, SOME CONSIDERATIONS CON-
CERNING BANKRUPTCY REFORM 55, 210 (Institute for the Future Report R-28, 1973);
D. STANLEY & M. GmT, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROcEss, REFORM 81 (1971); Coun-
tryman, For a New Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy, 14 RuTGERS L. R~v. 678 (1960);
Joslin, Debtors' Exemption Laws: Time for Modernization, 34 IND. L.J. 355 (1959);
Karlen, Exemptions from Execution, 22 Bus. LAw. 1167 (1967); Kennedy, Limitation
of Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 45 IowA L. REv. 445 (1960); Plumb, The Recommenda-
tions of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws-Exempt and Immune Property, 61
VA. L. REv. 1 (1975); Rombauer, Debtors' Exemption Statutes-Revision Ideas, 36
WASH. L. REV. 484 (1961); Vukowich, The Bankruptcy Commission's Proposal Regard-
ing Bankrupts' Exemption Rights, 63 CAL. L. REV. 1439 (1975); Vukowich, supra note
6; Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique and Suggestions, 68 YALE LJ. 1459 (1959).
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I. THE PROCEDURES
A. Execution of Judgments
To enforce a judgment,"' the judgment creditor obtains a writ of
execution from the clerk and delivers it to the sheriff, who levies upon
property of the judgment debtor. If the property is readily movable,
the sheriff levies by taking possession of it. Otherwise, the sheriff
levies by some form of notice, either served on the judgment debtor,
attached to the property, or recorded in a public office. 12  In some
states the judgment debtor has the right to specify which items of his
property the sheriff should levy on.' 3 After levying on the judgment
debtor's property, the sheriff advertises and sells it. He applies the
proceeds first to his costs and then to satisfaction of the judgment. Any
balance is given to the judgment debtor.' 4
If the property is not in the possession of the judgment debtor, than
typically the procedure is garnishment rather than execution." The
judgment creditor procures a writ of garnishment from the clerk and
delivers it to the sheriff, who serves it on the person in possession of
the property, the garnishee. The writ directs the garnishee to disclose
any property of the judgment debtor in the garnishee's possession and
any debt owed by the garnishee to the judgment debtor. It also directs
the garnishee to retain the property pending further notice or to turn
it over to the sheriff.'6
11. The states vary on when a judgment creditor may first enforce a judgment.
Some require only rendition of judgment, while others require some further step. E.g.,
CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 664 (Deering 1973) (entry); TEx. R. Civ. P. 627 (20 days after
rendition); see S. RESENFELD, CREDrroRs' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 55-60
(2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as RmSENFELD].
12. E.g., TEx. R. Cirv. P. 639; see RiESENFELD 166-69.
13. E.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-1562(B) (1956); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 513.095,
.100 (1959); Mo. R. CIrv. P. 76.25; TEx. R. Civ. P. 637; UTAH R. Civ. P. 69(d); see
Harmer v. DeMarcus, 390 U.S. 736, 737 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Most states
do not confer this right on the judgment debtor.
14. In some situations third parties may be able to intervene to assert rights superior
to the rights of the judgment creditor. See RmsENLD 198-200, 236-37.
15. RIESENFELD 167-69, 226-27.
16. See, e.g., UTAH R. CIrv. P. 64D (e)(i), (h); see RMSENFELD 226. An alternative
form of garnishment contemplates the initiation of a separate suit against the gar-
nishee, which culminates in a judgment against the garnishee. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.
105, -303, -405 (1974); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2715.11 (Page Supp. 1974).
If the property, such as United States patents, is not subject to execution or garnish-
ment, the judgment creditor must resort to a creditor's bill or to supplementary proceed-
ings in aid of execution. See RmSENFELD 276. These actions are initiated either by
[Vol. 1975:877
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B. Exemptions from Execution
The kinds of property exempt from execution vary widely from state
to state. Most commonly, states exempt a homestead, 17 wages,' 8 life
insurance,'" and enumerated items of tangible personalty.20 The pro-
cedure for claiming exemptions also varies among the states, and fre-
quently within a state, depending on the exemption claimed. Thus,
in a few states a judgment debtor must file a formal declaration with
the recorder of deeds to claim a homestead exemption,2' while in other
states he need only file a written claim with the sheriff or the court.22
In still others, the judgment debtor apparently may claim exemptions
by oral notice to the sheriff,23 or is entitled to exemptions without any
motion of the judgment creditor and notice to the person in possession of the property,
e.g., IND. R. Tit. P. 69(E); PA. R. Crv. P. 3118, or by separate suit against the person
in possession, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-601 (1955).
In connection with the enforcement of a judgment, the judgment creditor may acquire
a lien on the property of the judgment debtor. For example, in the great majority of
states, the judgment itself becomes a lien on the real property of the judgment debtor
in the county in which the judgment is recorded or docketed. See RESENFELD 94-95.
In addition, the writ of execution becomes a lien on personal property of the judgment
debtor either when the writ is delivered to the sheriff (with respect to all of his chattels
in the county) or when the writ is levied by the sheriff (with respect to the property
levied upon). See id. at 154-56. Liens also arise in garnishment and supplementary
proceedings. See id. at 233, 295-96. The lien has the effect of giving the judgment
creditor priority over anyone who subsequently acquires an interest in the property.
17. E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 5206(a) (McKinney Supp. 1975); Omo REv. CODE
AmN. § 2329.73 (Page 1954); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 6.12.090 (1963).
18. E.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 690.6 (Deering Supp. 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
62, § 73 (Smith-Hurd 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 886 (1966).
19. E.g., COLO. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 13-54-102(1) (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.14
(1961); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 175, § 125 (1970).
20. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 627.6(11) (1950) (bed); ME. R v. STAT. ANN. tit.
14, § 4401(6) (Supp. 1975) (refrigerator); T"x. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3836(a)(1)
(Supp. 1975) (household furnishings). See generally Vukowich, supra note 6, at
826-29.
21. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-41-202 (1973); N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw § 5206(b)
(McKinney Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-18-18 to -20 (1960). The time for
Sling a declaration varies. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 55-1005 (1957) (before judgment if
judgment is lien on property; otherwise before levy); WASH. Rnv. CODE ANN. § 6.12.010
(1963) (any time before sale).
22. E.g., CAL. CIrv. PRO. CODE §§ 690.235, .50 (Deering Supp. 1975) (sheriff); NEB.
REv. STAT. § 40-105 (1974) (application to court). Some states require a written claim
for personal property exemptions. E.g., CAL. Civ. PRo. CODE § 690.50 (Deering Supp.
1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 52, § 14 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975) (certain household furni-
tire but only if value is less than exemption); IowA CODE ANN. § 626.50 (1950).
23. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 52, § 14 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975) (unless value ex-
ceeds exemption); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1556 (1964).
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claim at all.24 To obtain an exemption, the judgment debtor has the
burden of proving that he is a member of the class of judgment debtors
entitled to the benefit of the exemption statute and also that the prop-
erty is of a type and amount that may be claimed.25 If he fails to claim
the exemption in time, he will be held to have waived it.20  If the judg-
ment debtor claims an exemption, the sheriff takes or retains possession
of the property, at least until he determines whether the debtor and
the property qualify.27  If the judgment debtor and the judgment credi-
tor disagree about whether the property is exempt, either may ask the
court to resolve the dispute. 28  Only a few states, however, require the
court to resolve this dispute within a specified time. 9 Until the court
rules, the sheriff retains possession of the property. 0
24. E.g., CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 690(b) (Deering Supp. 1975); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 5-5-105(4) (1973) (no claim need be filed for exempt wages); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 27A.6025 (Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-376 (1969) (if debtor fails to
select homestead, it shall be selected for him). The predecessor of the Michigan stat-
ute, MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.6025 (Supp. 1975), was construed in Vanderhorst v. Bacon,
38 Mich. 669 (1878).
25. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Larson, 213 Iowa 468, 239 N.W. 134 (1931); CAL.
CIV. PRO. CODE § 690.50(i) (Deering Supp. 1975). But see Noland Co. v. Linning,
132 So. 2d 802 (Fla. Ct. App. 1961). See also Vukowich, supra note 6, at 838.48.
26. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-55-107 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
6.16.080 (1963); In re Stem, 208 F. 488 (N.D. Ohio 1913) (Ohio law); Nationwide
Fin. Corp. v. Wolford, 80 Nev. 502, 396 P.2d 398 (1964); Reed v. Union Bank, 70 Va.
(29 Gratt.) 719, 724 (1878) (dictum). But see PA. R. Crv. P. 3123. For exemptions
other than the homestead exemption, the judgment debtor typically need not claim the
exemption at the time of levy; it suffices if he claims the exemption prior to sale. E.g.,
IowA CODE ANN. § 627.3 (1950) (unless required in writing by sheriff to make such
claim); PA. R. Civ. P. 3142(c).
If the judgment debtor has given the judgment creditor a security interest in the asset,
then as against that judgment creditor, he will be unable to claim the asset as exempt.
CAL. CIV. PRo. CODE § 690.52 (Deering Supp. 1975); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §
6.16.080 (1963). In addition, he may not be able to claim an exemption in property
for which the judgment creditor has obtained judgment for the purchase price. CAL.
Civ. PRO. CODE § 690.52 (Deering Supp. 1975); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.6024(2)
(1962). Nor may he claim an exemption against specified classes of creditors, for ex-
ample, persons who have been awarded alimony or child support and federal or state
governments that have obtained judgments for taxes. See generally Vukowich, supra
note 6, at 852-66.
27. E.g., NEB. RIv. STAT. § 25-1553 to -1554 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:17-
20 to -24 (1952); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-378 (1969).
28. E.g., CAL. Civ. PRo. CODE § 690.50(e) (Deering Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-381 (1969).
29. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 690.50(c), (e) (Deering Supp. 1975); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-55-104 (1973). See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-904 (1974) (at the first term of
court); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-381 (1969) (precedence over all other matters); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 23.168 (1973) (in a summary manner).
30. E.g., CAL. Civ. PRo. CODE § 690.50(h) (Deering Supp. 1975); COLO. REv. STAT.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/1
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Of the states surveyed, 31 none requires that the judgment debtor be
notified before issuance of a writ of execution, and only two require
notice to the debtor after issuance but before levy of the writ.32 A
few more require notice of levy, either at the time of levy or within
a prescribed time thereafter,33 but most do not require any notice to
the judgment debtor.
The problem for the judgment debtor is twofold. When the process
does not interfere with his possession and use of the property until after
the execution sale, he may never learn that a specific asset is about
to be taken to satisfy a judgment.3 4 An example is execution on a home-
stead in states where levy on realty occurs merely by filing the writ with
the recorder of deeds. Advertisement of the execution sale is designed
primarily to attract potential purchasers; it is neither calculated nor
likely to notify the judgment debtor. If he does not claim the exemp-
tion before the execution sale, the judgment debtor may be held to have
waived it even though he never knew that his property was to be sold. 5
This taking of his property without notice and without an opportunity to
prevent the taking presents the question whether the judgment debtor
ANN. § 13-55-105 (1973). The creditor may be required to post a bond, either in this
situation or to obtain execution generally, and the judgment debtor may be able to regain
possession of the property upon filing a bond. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 626.54, .58
(1950).
31. Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Ken-
tucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and
Washington. These states were selected on the bases of geographic diversity and popula-
tion.
32. Mo. REV. STAT. § 513.445 (1959); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 5225(a) (McKinney
1962).
33. CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE §§ 682(b), 688 (Deering Supp. 1975); CoLO. RaV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-55-102 (1973); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 52, § 14, (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975) (per-
sonal property); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 561.5, 642.14 (1950) (homestead, garnishment);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 425.190 (1969) (garnishment); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 236, §
3 (real property), ch. 246, § 5 (trustee process) (1974); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27A:6026
(1962) (homestead); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw §§ 5206(f), 5225(b) (MeKinney Supp.
1975) (homestead, garnishment); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-441 (Supp. 1975) (garnishment);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.33.320 (Supp. 1974) (garnishment); MicH. GEN. Cr. R.
738.3(4)(d) (garnishment); PA. R. Crv. P. 3140 (garnishment); TEx. R. Civ. P. 637;
Cf. UTAH R. Civ. P. 64D(h) (garnishee must notify judgment debtor only if judgment
creditor provides pre-addressed, stamped envelope).
34. For example, in Luskey v. Steffron, Inc., - Pa. -, 336 A.2d 298 (1975), the
judgment debtor did not learn of the levy and sale until he later tried to sell the prop-
erty. The property had been valued at $52,000, but was sold by the sheriff for $1,700.
35. See note 26 supra.
883
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has been deprived of his property without due process of law. For most
kinds of property, of course, levy is by seizure rather than by notice.
When the property is seized by the sheriff, the judgment debtor is likely
to know of the levy before the sale occurs and to have an opportunity
to claim the exemption. Even if he knows of the seizure, however,
he is deprived of the use of the property from the time of levy to the
time the exemption is allowed. This taking, before any adjudication
of whether the property may properly be taken to satisfy a judgment,
also presents the constitutional issue. 8
I. THE CONSTITUTION
A. Sniadach, Fuentes, and Mitchell-The Prejudgment Cases Intro-
duced
The fourteenth amendment forbids the states to deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 7 Before a state
deprives a person of property it must give him notice and an oppor-
tunity to present reasons why the deprivation should not occur.8 Thus,
in Sniadach the Supreme Court held that prejudgment garnishment of
wages is a taking of property entitled to due process protection and that
due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before the
wages may be taken, even temporarily.8 9 Three years later, in Fuentes
36. The question also arises because the judgment may not be valid, because the par-
ties may be in disagreement whether or to what extent a judgment has been satisfied,
and because a third party may have an interest in the asset seized. See Countryman,
supra note 3, at 543-45; Dunham, supra note 4.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "INlor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... ." See also id. amend. V.
38. E.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
39. 395 U.S. 337 (1969); see id. at 342 (Harlan, J., concurring). Similarly, the
due process clause limits a state's power to incarcerate a person for an alleged tax liabil-
ity before a judicial determination that he is liable. In Non-Resident Taxpayers Ass'n
v. Murray, 347 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affd mem., 410 U.S. 919 (1973), a three-
judge court upheld a statute permitting arrest as a means of commencing an action to
collect a city income tax, but only because a local procedural rule provided that the de-
fendant be given notice and a hearing prior to the arrest. Two other courts upheld
against fifth amendment attack section 7402(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
authorizing the ex parte issuance of a writ ne exeat republica to restrain a de-
fendant from leaving the country, but held that the government has the burden of
showing exceptional circumstances justifying the restraint and that the defendant must
be afforded a full and speedy hearing after the initial restraint. United States v. Sha-
heen, 445 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1971) (writ vacated); United States v. Robbins, 235 F. Supp.
353 (E.D. Ark. 1964) (same). In a pre-Sniadach case, the California Supreme Court
struck down a statute permitting mesne civil arrest of an alleged debtor for concealment
[Vol. 1975:877
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v. Shevin,4 ° the Court held unconstitutional two statutes 1 that per-
mitted prejudgment replevin of property other than wages without prior
notice and opportunity for a hearing. Emphasizing that due process
must be provided even for deprivations of limited duration, the Court
stated:
The Fourteenth Amendment draws no bright lines around three-day,
10-day or 50-day deprivations of property. Any significant taking of
property by the State is within the purview of the Due Process Clause.
While the length and consequent severity of a deprivation may be
another factor to weigh in determining the appropriate form of hearing,
it is not decisive of the basic right to a prior hearing of some kind.42
The failure of the statutes to provide for notice and an opportunity for
a hearing before the deprivation of property rendered the statutes
unconstitutional.
Two years after Fuentes, however, in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,43
the Court upheld a statute44 authorizing an ex parte procedure equivalent
to replevin. In holding that it was constitutionally permissible to post-
pone the notice and opportunity for a hearing until after the deprivation
occurred, the Court emphasized the creditor's security interest in the
property, the supervision and control of the process by a judicial officer,
and the promptness of judicial review of the propriety of the taking4"
Some of the Justices believed that Mitchell effectively overruled
Fuentes, 4 but in 1975 the Court relied on Sniadach and Fuentes when
of property that the creditor sought to recover. The statute failed to require that the
debtor be notified of his right to apply to have the arrest order vacated or the bail re-
duced and failed to provide for legal assistance to those arrested. In re Harris, 69 Cal.
2d 486, 446 P.2d 148, 72 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1968). In light of Sniadach and Fuentes,
mesne arrest would be permissible without a prior hearing, if at all, only in "extraor-
dinary" circumstances. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-93 (1972); Sniadach v. Fam-
ily Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969).
40. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
41. Act of June 27, 1967, ch. 67-254, § 28, [1967] Fla. Laws 660; PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 1821 (1967). After Fuentes, Florida revised its replevin statute and Pennsyl-
vania revised its rules of civil procedure relating to replevin actions. Act of May 8,
1973, ch. 73-20, [1973] Fla. Laws 53 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.01-.21 (SUpp.
1975)); PA. R. Crv. P. 1072-87, 1353, 1354 (1975).
42. 407 U.S. at 86.
43. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
44. IA. CODE Civ. PRo. ANN. arts. 3501, 3506, 3574 (West 1961).
45. 416 U.S. at 607-10, 615-16.
46. Id. at 623, 634 (1974) (concurring and dissenting opinions); see North Ga. Fin.
ishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 609, 615-16 (1975) (concurring and dissent-
ing opinions).
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it held a garnishment of a corporate bank account to violate due
process. 47  Thus, absent an extraordinary situation, 48 a debtor may not
be deprived of his property until there has been some determination
by a neutral government official that the deprivation is proper .4
B. Due Process After Judgment
(1) Execution and Garnishment
These recent cases concern prejudgment deprivations. But inas-
much as they reject long-held views of due process in the debtor-credi-
tor context, they suggest that yesterday's views of due process after
judgment may also be rejected.50 Yesterday's view is typified by Endi-
cott Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, Inc., 1 decided over fifty
47. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
48. The "extraordinary situation" exception to the requirement of prior notice was
articulated in Fuentes. 407 U.S. at 90-93. Cases permitting prehearing seizures include
the following: Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974);
Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332
U.S. 245 (1947); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); Coffin Bros. & Co.
v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921). See note 39
supra; text following note 143 infra.
49. In Mitchell the Court emphasized supervision of the process by a judge. This
was one of the bases for distinguishing the statute challenged in North Ga. Finishing,
Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 607 (1975). Justice Powell, concurring in Di-
Chem, stated that supervision by a neutral officer other than a judge would suffice. Id.
at 611 n.3. Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger expressed a simi-
lar view, id. at 619 (dissenting opinion), as did Justice White in Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134, 196-99 (1974) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
50. Indeed, even before Sniadach, three Justices hinted that due process requires no-
tice before execution of judgment. In Knight v. DeMarcus, 102 Ariz. 105, 425 P.2d
837 (1967), the Arizona Supreme Court held that the constitutional issue was not pro-
erly raised, but stated that due process was not denied by a procedural rule authorizing
issuance of a writ of execution without prior notice to the judgment debtor. The Su-
preme Court of the United States granted certiorari to consider the constitutional ques-
tion, Hanner v. DeMarcus, 389 U.S. 926 (1967), but subsequently dismissed the writ
as improvidently granted, 390 U.S. 736 (1968), evidently for the reason that the issue
was not properly raised. Id. at 737-40 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Four Justices dissented
from the dismissal of the writ, three of them suggesting that Endicott should be over-
ruled. Id. at 740-42. Twice since DeMarcus the constitutional issue has been appealed
to the Supreme Court, but each time the Court has dismissed the writ. Wood v. Atkin-
son, 416 U.S. 901 (1974), dismissing appeal from 231 Ga. 271, 201 S.E.2d 394 (1973);
Moya v. DeBaca, 395 U.S. 825 (1969), dismissing appeal from 286 F. Supp. 606(D.N.M. 1968). The Court's refusal to re-examine Endicott may be more a conclusion
that the proper opportunity has not arisen than a conviction that Endicott still represents
the correct view. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 3, at 175 n.67.
51. 266 U.S. 285 (1924).
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years ago. The Supreme Court there held that a statute authorizing
ex parte issuance of an order garnishing a judgment debtor's wages did
not violate the due process clause.
[T]he established rules of our system of jurisprudence do not require
that a defendant who has been granted an opportunity to be heard and
has had his day in court, should, after a judgment has been rendered
against him, have a further notice and hearing before supplemental pro-
ceedings are taken to reach his property in satisfaction of the judgment.
Thus, in the absence of a statutory requirement, it is not essential that
he be given notice before the issuance of an execution against his
tangible property; after the rendition of the judgment he must take
"notice of what will follow," no further notice being "necessary to
advance justice."'5 2
Many other courts have reached the same conclusion. 8 It is important,
52. Id. at 288. In the next paragraph of its opinion, the Court extended this lan-
guage to garnishment. Id. at 289. It is not clear from the opinion whether the Court
thought the notice requirement was satisfied by the initial service of process or by the
rendition of judgment. State court cases decided both before and after Endicott have
viewed the initial service of process as satisfying the notice requirement and have viewed
the trial that resulted in judgment as satisfying the hearing requirement. High v. Bank
of Commerce, 95 Cal. 386, 387, 30 P. 556, 557 (1892); Zimek v. Illinois Nat'l Cas.
Co., 370 I11. 572, 574-75, 19 N.E.2d 620, 622 (1939); Lenske v. Shobe, 6 Ore. App.
472, 488 P.2d 852 (1971). But see Hanner v. DeMarcus, 390 U.S. 736, 741-42 (1968)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
In Endicott the Court cited sixteen cases in support of the proposition that no further
notice is necessary in connection with postjudgment execution or garnishment. All six-
teen were decided by state courts, and at least three involved prejudgment garnishment.
Most significantly, thirteen were decided under the applicable statutes, and only three
of the sixteen expressly considered any constitutional problems. Of the three, two were
from the same jurisdiction. Coffee v. Haynes, 124 Cal. 561, 57 P. 482 (1899); High
v. Bank of Commerce, 95 Cal. 386, 30 P. 556 (1892). The third, Cross v. Brown, 19
R.I. 220, 33 A. 147 (1895), aff'd, 175 U.S. 396 (1899), concerned prejudgment trustee
process against a nonresident and held that the court could acquire jurisdiction over the
res, but did not consider whether the Constitution required notice to the principal de-
fendant. Therefore, only the two California cases supported the Court's conclusion.
53. Coffee v. Haynes, 124 Cal. 561, 57 P. 482 (1899); High v. Bank of Commerce,
95 Cal. 386, 30 P. 556 (1892), overruling Bryant v. Bank of Cal., 2 Cal. Unrep. 567,
8 P. 644 (1885); District Credit Clothing, Inc. v. Square Deal Trucking Co., 163 A.2d
822 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1960); Zimek v. Illinois Nat'l Cas. Co., 370 Ill. 572, 19
N.E.2d 620 (1939); Chalmette Petroleum Corp. v. Myrtle Grove Syrup Co., 175 La.
969, 144 So. 730 (1932); Edwards v. Stein, 94 NJ. Eq. 251, 119 A. 504 (Ch. 1923)
(notice after levy suffices); City of Wilmington v. Sprunt, 114 N.C. 310, 19 S.E. 348
(1894); First Nat'l Bank v. Knight, 127 Okla. 20, 259 P. 565 (1927); Southern Ry. v.
Williams, 141 Tenn. 46, 206 S.W. 186 (1918). For more recent cases, see cases cited
in note 79 infra.
Only a few courts have held to the contrary. Brown v. liberty Loan Corp., 392 F.
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however, that the Court in Endicott did not consider any possibility that
the judgment debtor might be deprived of exempt property. 4 The
statute upheld in Endicott authorized garnishment of only ten percent
of a judgment debtor's wages, and the judgment creditor sought only
Supp. 1023 (M.D. Fla. 1974); Scott v. Danaher, 343 F. Supp. 1272 (N.D. Ill. 1972);
Taylor v. Madigan, No. 443647 (Cal. Super. Ct., Aug. 21, 1974), rev'd, 53 Cal. App.
3d 943, 126 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1975); State Bank v. McKibben, 146 Kan. 341, 70 P.2d 1
(1937); Luskey v. Steffron, Inc., - Pa. -, 336 A.2d 298 (1975); cf. Mathis
v. Purdy, 40 Fla. Supp. 17 (Dade County Cir. Ct. 1973) (statute may not pro-
hibit sheriff from accepting claim of exemption before levy). In Danaher, the
garnishment followed entry of a judgment by confession. The court held the gar-
nishment statute unconstitutional because, when used in conjunction with judgment by
confession, it permitted taking of property without any actual notice to the debtor at
any time. The~court's reasoning seems weak, however, since the critical defect that the
court found was the lack of notice of the rendition of judgment, and this defect lies in
the confession of judgment statute, not the garnishment statute. See D.H. Overmyer Co.
v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972); Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa.
1970), aft'd, 405 U.S. 191 (1972). In Taylor v. Madigan, the trial court held that after
levy but before sale, the judgment debtor must be given notice of his right to claim a
homestead exemption. Thus by allowing levy before notice, the court permitted interfer-
ence with the debtor's right to dispose of his property. And in McKibben, although the
Kansas court expressly stated that the Kansas and United States constitutions required
notice before levy of garnishment, the court also invoked as alternative grounds the doc-
trine of equitable estoppel and the judgment creditor's failure to comply with the proce-
dural requirements of the garnishment statute.
Apart from the constitutional question, the great majority of courts have construed
their state statutes either as not requiring notice and hearing or as not making the re-
quirement jurisdictional. Hexter v. Clifford, 5 Colo. 168 (1879); J.J. Smith Lumber Co.
v. Scott County Garbage Reducing & Fuel Co., 149 Iowa 272, 128 N.W. 389 (1910);
Ayres v. Campbell, 9 Iowa 213 (1859); Walker v. Creevy, 57 La. 535 (1851); Ketcham
v. Grove, 115 Mich. 60, 72 N.W. 1110 (1897); Wipperman Mercantile Co. v. Jacobson,
133 Minn. 326, 158 N.W. 606 (1916); McAnaw v. Mathis, 129 Mo. 142, 31 S.W. 144
(1895); Wright v. Southern Ry., 141 N.C. 164, 53 S.E. 831 (1906); Reid v. North-West-
ern R.R., 32 Pa. 257 (1858) (sequestration); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Whipker, 77 Tex.
14, 13 S.W. 639 (1890); Winner v. Hoyt, 68 Wis. 278, 32 N.W. 128 (1887). Contra,
Union Pac. Ry. v. Smersh, 22 Neb. 751, 755, 36 N.W. 139, 142 (1888) ("While the
statute does not require notice to be given to the judgment debtor in cases of garnishment
after judgment, yet it is obvious that such notice should be required in every case
.... "); Harrison v. Williams, 95 Okla. 142, 218 P. 305 (1922); State Nat'1 Bank v.
Lowenstein, 52 Okla. 259, 155 P. 1127 (1915) (garnishment before judgment but after
suit against principal defendant commenced). See also McKenzie v. Hill, 9 Cal. App.
78, 98 P. 55 (1908) (no need to give the judgment debtor notice of appeal by the gar-
nishee in supplementary proceedings); Schwander v. Feeney's, 42 Del. 198, 29 A.2d 369
(Super. Ct. 1942) (either debtor must be notified of garnishment proceedings or record
must show that substantive requirements of statute have been met).
54. Moreover, the appellant was the garnishee, not the judgment debtor, and was
seeking only a determination that the garnishment statute was unconstitutional. Thus
the appellant, attempting to distinguish garnishment from execution, conceded, "It is rec-
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that percentage. 55 Nevertheless, Endicott has been cited as controlling
even when a judgment debtor is deprived of arguably exempt property.56
In recent years, however, at least two courts have found denials of
due process by statutes providing for the collection of judgments when
arguably exempt property was levied on. In Florida a judgment debtor
is entitled to an exemption of personal property, 57 to be selected by
him and claimed by filing an affidavit with the sheriff.58 In Mathis
v. Purdy,59 the judgment debtor attempted to file the affidavit before
any levy on his property, but the sheriff refused to accept it, asserting
that the affidavit could be filed only after the levy. The judgment
debtor then filed a class action in state court to test the constitutionality
of the statute on which the sheriff relied. 60 Stating that it would be
a violation of due process not to permit the filing of an exemption claim
before the levy, the court interpreted the statute to require the sheriff
to accept affidavits of judgment debtors any time after entry of final
judgment. The court did not, however, require any notice to the judg-
ment debtor either before or after levy.
A United States District Court took this further step in Brown v.
Liberty Loan Corp.6 With no notice to the judgment debtor, the sheriff
served a writ of garnishment on her employer .6  A state statute ex-
empted all wages of the head of a family residing in the state.63 The
employer informed the judgment debtor of the garnishment on the day
the writ was served. That same day, the judgment debtor filed an affi-
davit of exemption with the county court from which the writ had is-
sued. The following day the judgment creditor filed a counter-affidavit,
denying the assertions in the debtor's affidavit.6" After a hearing two
ognized that an ordinary execution against property is a remedial process, following
entry of judgment as a matter of course, and not requiring notice to the judgment
debtor." Brief for Appellant at 54, Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, Inc.,
266 U.S. 285 (1924) (emphasis added). The judgment debtor in Endicott never ob-
jected, at least formally, to the garnishment. Brief for Respondent at 6.
55. 266 U.S. at 286-87.
56. Langford v. Tennessee, 356 F. Supp. 1163 (W.D. Tenn. 1973); Moya v.
DeBaca, 286 F. Supp. 606 (D.N.M. 1968), appeal dismissed, 395 U.S. 825 (1969).
57. FLA. CoNST. art. X, § 4(a)(2).
58. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.06 (1961).
59. 40 Fla. Supp. 17 (Dade County Cir. Ct. 1973).
60. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.06 (1961).
61. 392 F. Supp. 1023 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
62. Id. at 1026-27.
63. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.11 (1961).
64. 392 F. Supp. at 1027; see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.12 (1961). See also note 239
infra.
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weeks later, the county court found that the judgment debtor was enti-
tled to the exemption and therefore dissolved the writ of garnishment,
permitting the judgment debtor to receive the detained wages.05 Mean-
while, the judgment debtor had filed in federal district court a class
action against the judgment creditor and the court clerk who had issued
the writ, seeking damages and declaratory relief. Describing Endicott
as a "case which is of extremely doubtful precedential value now," 6 the
district court held that due process requires notice and an opportunity
for a hearing on exemption claims before a writ of garnishment is
served on a judgment debtor's employer. The notice provided in the
suit in which the judgment had been obtained did not satisfy this re-
quirement. Less than two months after this opinion was rendered, the
Chief Judge of the Fourth Judicial Circuit of Florida issued an admin-
istrative order prohibiting postjudgment issuance of writs of garnish-
ment unless the judgment creditor swears that the garnishment is not
of wages and gives the judgment debtor notice that he will seek the
writ.67
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court emphasized the importance of no-
tice in Luskey v. Ste fron, Inc., 8 when it held unconstitutional that
state's procedures 9 for subjecting real property to satisfaction of judg-
ments. In Pennsylvania, real property cannot be exempt from execu-
tion because the state has no homestead exemption. 0 Nevertheless,
the court held that providing notice only by publication in a local news-
paper and by posting handbills on the property and in the sheriff's of-
fice violated due process because the procedure failed to provide "per-
sonal notice to the owner [that his] real estate [was] the subject of a
sheriffs sale."'71
65. 392 F. Supp. at 1027. Under FLA. STAT. ANN. § 77.06(1) (Supp. 1975), a writ
of garnishment reaches debts owed any time between the date of service on the garnishee
and the date the garnishee files his answer to the writ. In Brown, since the employer
filed an answer to the writ the day after the writ was served, the amount of wages af-
fected was only $7.50.
66. Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., 392 F. Supp. 1023, 1036 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
67. Administrative Order for the Fourth Judicial Circuit of Florida, January 10,
1975.
68. - Pa. -, 336 A.2d 298 (1975).
69. PA. R. CIrv. P. 3129 (1975).
70. Even in a state with a homestead exemption, the judgment debtor in Luskey
probably would not have been entitled to an exemption. Homestead exemptions may
be claimed only if the property is used as the debtor's residence. In Luskey, the debtor
evidently did not live on the property. See - Pa. at -, 336 A.2d at 298.
71. Id. at -, 336 A.2d at 299.
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In contrast, a California court of appeals in Raigoza v. Sper 72
rejected a constitutional attack on a statute73 authorizing postjudgment
garnishment of wages. The court stated that it was irrelevant that the
claimed exemption was for wages and denied that Sniadach created a
special rule for wages. 74 It found no denial of due process in the stat-
ute's failure to afford the judgment debtor an opportunity to claim
exemptions before his salary or other property was taken by levy." At
about the same time the California court was deciding Raigoza, a simi-
lar case was before a three-judge federal court in Tennessee, where a
statute provided for a personal property exemption and authorized a
judgment debtor to file a petition to claim the exemption.70 In Langford
v. Tennessee,77 a judgment creditor levied on a car, which the judgment
debtor then claimed as exempt. The sheriff released the car to the
debtor, who subsequently sought declaratory and injunctive relief. In
a conclusory opinion, relying on Endicott and rejecting the applicability
of Sniadach and Fuentes, the court held that the execution statutes did
not deny due process "simply because they allow levy of execution after
judgment but without providing for a prior hearing to determine
whether the property to be levied upon is exempt under other statutory
provisions. 'T  In similarly short, conclusory opinions, several other
courts have rejected constitutional attacks on execution statutes.71
72. 34 Cal. App. 3d 560, 110 Cal. Rptr. 296 (1973).
73. CAL. Crv. PRo. CODE § 690.6 (Deering 1973), as amended, CAL. Civ. PRo.
CODE § 690.6 (Deering Supp. 1975).
74. 34 Cal. App. 3d at 565-66, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 300. But see Brown v. Liberty
Loan Corp., 392 F. Supp. 1023, 1032-34 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
75. The California Court of Appeals reached similar conclusions in two other cases.
In Phillips v. Bartolomie, 46 Cal. App. 3d 346, 121 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1975), the court up-
held garnishment without notice on exempt disability pension and AFDC payments. In
Taylor v. Madigan, No. 443647 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 1974), a California superior
court held unconstitutional that state's statutes authorizing execution sales of real prop-
erty that may be claimed exempt as homesteads. The court enjoined the sheriff from
selling any realty pursuant to a writ of execution unless the judgment debtor is first
served with notice that he may be able to claim a homestead exemption and that he
must file his claim within the next twenty days. The court of appeals reversed. 53
Cal. App. 3d 943, 126 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1975). Meanwhile, the legislature amended the
execution statutes to require such a notice to the judgment debtor at the time a writ of
execution on his house is served upon him. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 682(b) (Deering
Supp. 1975).
76. TENN. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-201 (Supp. 1975).
77. 356 F. Supp. 1163 (W.D. Tenn. 1973) (three-judge court).
78. Id. at 1164; accord, Halpern v. Austin, 385 F. Supp. 1009 (N.D. Ga. 1974)
(three-judge court).
79. Katz v. Ke Nam Kim, 379 F. Supp. 65 (D. Hawaii 1974); Moya v. DeBaca,
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(2) Other Postiudgment Situations
Most courts that have considered the question in recent years have
held notice and hearing not to be constitutionally required before a
judgment debtor's property may be taken to satisfy a judgment. Their
reasoning has two components: the Supreme Court expressly rejected
the requirement in Endicott; and Endicott is not overruled by Sniadach
and other prejudgment cases. This reasoning fails to take sufficient
account of the development of due process in the last fifty years, when
prior notice and hearing have been held necessary in other proceedings
to enforce judgments. For example, notice and hearing are required
before a judgment debtor can be imprisoned for failing to appear at
a disclosure hearing ° or for failing to make payments ordered in
divorce proceedings.8 ' These cases, however, concerned deprivation
286 F. Supp. 606 (D.N.M. 1968), appeal dismissed, 395 U.S. 825 (1969); Sackin v.
Kersting, 105 Ariz. 464, 466 P.2d 758 (1970); Knight v. DeMarcus, 102 Ariz. 105, 425
P.2d 837 (1967), cert. granted sub non. Harmer v. DeMarcus, 389 U.S. 926 (1967),
writ of cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 390 U.S. 736 (1968); Wilson v. Grimes,
232 Ga. 388, 207 S.E.2d 5 (1974); Wood v. Atkinson, 231 Ga. 271, 201 SE.2d 394
(1973), appeal dismissed, 416 U.S. 901 (1974); Chonowski v. Bonucci, 47 Iln. 2d 510,
267 N.E.2d 671 (1971); Credit Serv. Co. v. Linnerooth, 290 Minn. 256, 187 N.W.2d
632 (1971); Bittner v. Butts, 514 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. 1974); Hehr v. Tucker, 256 Ore.
254, 472 P.2d 797 (1970); Lenske v. Shobe, 6 Ore. App. 472, 488 P.2d 852 (1971);
Milne v. Shell Oil Co., 129 Vt. 375, 278 A.2d 741 (1971).
80. Desmond v. Hachey, 315 F. Supp. 328 (D. Me. 1970) (three-judge court). In
Vail v. Quinlan, 406 F. Supp. 951, 959-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), a three-judge court held
that the notice must be clear and complete, including a "stark warning that failure to
appear [at the contempt hearing] may result in contempt of court and imprisonment."
Shortly before Endicott, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that a statutory require-
ment that notice be given a judgment debtor before he could be compelled to attend dis-
closure proceedings was jurisdictional in nature. Hammond v. District Court, 30 N.M.
130, 228 P. 758 (1924). The reason for the court's conclusion was that new issues were
to be determined in the disclosure proceedings. Id. at 136, 228 P. at 760. In State v.
Montoya, 74 N.M. 743, 398 P.2d 263 (1965), the court stated that since the statute in-
volved in Hammond had been replaced by a rule of civil procedure that made supple-
mentary proceedings part of the original proceedings, no notice was required. In 1927
the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals held that Endicott was dispositive on the
question whether notice was required before a creditor could obtain ex parte an order
compelling the judgment debtor to appear at disclosure hearings and restraining him
from disposing of his assets. Commercial Nat'l Trust & Say. Bank v. Hamilton, 101
NJ. Eq. 249, 137 A. 403 (Ct. Err. & App. 1927). But cf. Coe v. Armour Fertilizer
Works, 237 U.S. 413 (1915) (notice and hearing required before property of share-
holder may be taken to satisfy judgment against corporation).
81. Yoder v. County of Cumberland, 278 A.2d 379 (Me. 1971); Mills v. Howard,




of liberty rather than property,82 so the development that has occurred
in connection with taking a person's property to satisfy an alimony or
support decree may be more persuasive on the constitutional question.
Under New York law an alimony decree could not be enforced by
execution until a court ordered the decree docketed as a judgment for
a specific amount of accrued alimony. Upon motion to docket a
decree, the other party could obtain a retroactive modification on speci-
fied grounds.83 In Griffin v. Griffin,84 a New York supreme court
granted plaintiff's ex parte motion for judgment for accrued alimony
installments. The United States Supreme Court held that this judg-
ment violated due process because the defendant spouse was entitled
to notice and an opportunity for a hearing before entry of a judgment
that would cut off his right to a retroactive modification of the decree.
Due process was not satisfied by defendant's ability to set aside or
otherwise collaterally attack the judgment after it was rendered.85 In
blunting the force of Endicott, the Court stated:
While it is undoubtedly true that the [original] decree . . . gave
petitioner notice at the time of its entry that further proceedings might
be taken . . . , we find in this no ground for saying that due process
does not require further notice of the time and place of such further
proceedings, inasmuch as they undertook substantially to affect his rights
in ways in which the [original] decree did not.86
On similar facts, state courts have reached the same result,87 and the
rationale of these cases casts doubt on the continued vitality of Endicott.
82. For a general discussion of liberty and property interests entitled to due process
protection, see Rendleman, The New Due Process: Rights and Remedies, 63 Ky. L.J.
531,543-59 (1975).
83. See Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 227 (1946).
84. 327 U.S. 220 (1946).
85. Id. at 230-32.
86. Id. at 229 (footnote omitted). The Court did not, however, specifically discuss
or cite Endicott.
87. Reichert v. Appel, 74 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1954); Wilson v. Wilson, 143 Me. 113,
56 A.2d 453 (1947); Gillespie v. Gillespie, 186 Misc. 845, 62 N.Y.S.2d 271 (Sup. Ct.
1946); Perry v. Perry, 51 Wash. 2d 358, 318 P.2d 968 (1957). Because the court re-
tains jurisdiction from the earlier proceedings, however, the notice need not be by per-
sonal service. Sewell v. Trimble, 172 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Rice v. Rice, 213 Ark.
981, 214 S.W.2d 235 (1948); Darden v. Darden, 144 A.2d 697 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App.
1958); Franklin v. Bonner, 201 Iowa 516, 207 N.W. 778 (1926) (pre-Griffin case); Ag-
doff v. Ageloff, 207 Misc. 804, 140 N.Y.S.2d 424 (Sup. CL 1955); Perry v. Perry, supra.
If the decree is not modifiable retroactively with respect to installments that have al-
ready accrued, then on the authority of Endicott no notice is required before rendition
of a judgment for accrued installments. Jenner v. Jenner, 138 Colo. 149, 330 P.2d 544
Vol. 1975:8771
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(3) Motions
In Endicott the Supreme Court stated that notice before issuance of
a writ of execution is not necessary because the process is merely sup-
plementary to the judgment and because the judgment debtor is
presumed to know that the judgment creditor will take steps to enforce
the judgment. 88  Other courts, both before and after Endicott, also
have relied on this reasoning to conclude that further notice is not
necessary.89 But even if collection procedures are part of the effort
(1958); Burke v. Burke, 127 Colo. 257, 255 P.2d 740 (1953); Wood v. Atkinson, 231
Ga. 271, 201 S.E.2d 394 (1973), appeal dismissed, 416 U.S. 901 (1974); see Knight
v. DeMarcus, 102 Ariz. 105, 425 P.2d 837 (1967), cert. granted sub nom. Hanner v.
DeMarcus, 389 U.S. 926 (1967), writ of cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 390
U.S. 736 (1968) (no notice of levy to collect fee awarded to special master in divorce
proceedings); cf. Halpern v. Austin, 385 F. Supp. 1009 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (three-judge
court) (no constitutional requirement that a person previously ordered to pay alimony
be given notice before his wages are garnished to satisfy accrued installments).
Similarly, it has been held that once a proper judgment for arrears has been entered,
there is no right to notice before issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the judgment,
even though issuance of the writ of execution is discretionary with the court. Strudwick
v. Strudwick, 110 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Sup. Ct. 1952). The rationale of Grilffin would seem
to require that the defendant be given an opportunity to influence the court's exercise
of discretion on the question whether to authorize issuance of a writ of execution. See
DiPietro v. Lavigne, 98 N.H. 294, 99 A.2d 413 (1953) (even though court has discretion
to deny motion for new trial, it cannot do so without affording movant an opportunity
to be heard in behalf of his motion).
88. 266 U.S. at 288-89, quoted in text accompanying note 52 supra.
89. In Zimek v. Illinois Nat'l Cas. Co., 370 Ill. 572, 574-75, 19 N.E.2d 620, 622
(1939), the court stated:
The garnishment process is remedial in nature, designed to reach property be-
longing to the judgment debtor after ordinary execution has failed. . . . It is
not a distinct and separate suit, but an additional step in the original action
for judgment. . . . So long as [the judgment debtor] was personally served
with process or entered his appearance in the damage suit, he is not entitled
to notice of garnishment, which is in aid of that suit. His knowledge of the
principal action against him is sufficient warning that his adversary may be
expected to take all available steps to obtain satisfaction of any judgment ren-
dered. We, therefore, hold that the due process requirements in garnishment
proceedings are satisfied by proper notice to the principal debtor of the original
suit brought by the creditor.
In High v. Bank of Commerce, 95 Cal. 386, 387, 30 P. 556, 557 (1892), after stating
that an original action is pending until the judgment is satisfied, the court stated:
So far as the judgment debtor is concerned, he cannot complain; he is a party
to the judgment, and is fully aware of the legal effect of it, viz., that what his
debtors owe him can be applied, by proper proceedings in the action which is
still pending, to the satisfaction of his judgment debts; and due process of law
has been had to make him aware of that fact.
See also Raigoza v. Sperl, 34 Cal. App. 3d 560, 110 Cal. Rptr. 296 (1973); Schwander
v. Feeney's, 42 Del. 198, 29 A.2d 369 (Super. Ct. 1942); Ayres v. Campbell, 9 Iowa
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/1
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to enforce a claim and the debtor knows or should know that after judg-
ment the creditor will take steps to enforce the claim, further notice
still may be constitutionally compelled. In contexts other than the
enforcement of judgments, a litigant is entitled to notice after original
service in the action even though no new and separate proceedings are
involved and even though he knows or should know that the other party
may seek additional relief. Thus, in avoiding an order granting an ex
parte motion to set aside a prior court order, a Florida court stated:
No rule is more firmly founded in the jurisprudence of this state than
that it is a denial of due process of law to hold a hearing on a motion
without notice to the parties involved in an adversary proceeding and
to enter an order on the motion without first giving the parties affected
notice and an opportunity to be heard before a party's rights are taken
away.90
213 (1859); Ketcham v. Kent Circuit Judge, 115 Mich. 60, 72 N.W. 1110 (1897) (pre-
judgment garnishment); Commercial Nat'l Trust & Say. Bank v. Hamilton, 101 N.J. Eq.
249, 137 A. 403 (Ct. Err. & App. 1927); City of Wilmington v. Sprunt, 114 N.C. 310,
19 S.E. 348 (1894); First Nat'l Bank v. Knight, 127 Okla. 20, 259 P. 565 (1927).
This reasoning has also been invoked by several state courts that, without considering
any constitutional issue, decided the applicable state statutes did not require notice.
E.g., Hexter v. Clifford, 5 Colo. 168 (1879); Wipperman Mercantile Co. v. Jacobson,
133 Minn. 326, 158 N.W. 606 (1916); Wright v. Railroad, 141 N.C. 164, 53 S.E. 831
(1906); Reid v. North-Western R.R., 32 Pa. 257 (1858); Winner v. Hoyt, 68 Wis. 278,
32 N.W. 128 (1887). But cf. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Whipsker, 77 Tex. 14, 13 S.W. 639
(1890) (since notice to principal defendant not required, if garnishee fails to assert prin-
cipal defendant's exemption, garnishee is liable to principal defendant).
In recent years a number of courts have held notice unnecessary, reasoning that Snia-
dach, or its rationale, applies only to prejudgment remedies. Langford v. Tennessee, 356
F. Supp. 1163 (W.D. Tenn. 1973); Sackin v. Kersting, 105 Ariz. 464, 466 P.2d 758
(1970); Wilson v. Grimes, 232 Ga. 388, 207 S.E.2d 5 (1974); Chonowski v. Bonucci,
47 Ill. 2d 519, 267 N.E.2d 671 (1971) (other judgment creditors not entitled to notice);
Credit Serv. Co. v. Linnerooth, 290 Minn. 256, 187 N.W.2d 632 (1971); Hehr v.
Tucker, 256 Ore. 254, 472 P.2d 797 (1970); Lenske v. Shobe, 6 Ore. App. 472, 488
P.2d 852 (1971); Milne v. Shell Oil Co., 129 Vt. 375, 278 A.2d 741 (1971).
90. Prunty v. State ex rel. Williams, 226 So. 2d 448, 450 (Fla. Ct. App. 1969). An-
other court required notice of an amendment to a complaint when the amendment stated
a new cause of action. Chapman v. Chapman, 284 App. Div. 504, 132 N.Y.S.2d 707
(1954). In holding that notice of a new trial date must be given, the court in Laird
v. Rinckey, 371 Mich. 96, 98, 123 N.W.2d 243, 244 (1963), stated, "It is hardly neces-
sary to buttress with citations the settled rule of law that due process requires notice
so that opportunity is afforded to attend and present a claim or defense." Many courts
require that notice be given of motions for additional relief. See, e.g., Commercial Cas.
Ins. Co. v. White Line Transfer & Storage Co., 114 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1940) (motion
for default judgment); McClintock v. Serv-Us Bakers, 103 Ariz. 72, 436 P.2d 891
(1968) (same); Phoenix Metals Corp. v. Roth, 79 Ariz. 106, 284 P.2d 645 (1955)
(same); Brooker v. Smith, 101 So. 2d 607 (Fla. Ct. App. 1958) (motion to sever issues
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And although the court in a divorce proceeding typically retains juris-
diction of the case even after the court renders a decree, 9' no modifica-
tion of the decree will be upheld unless the parties are afforded prior
notice and an opportunity to be heard.9
(4) A Synthesis
The element common to these situations in which the courts have
required notice is the existence in the subsequent proceedings of a
question that could not have been raised in the earlier proceedings. For
example, a Maine statute authorized execution against the body of a
person who failed to pay a spouse's attorneys fees as ordered in a di-
vorce proceeding.93 In Yoder v. County of Cumberland,94 the Supreme
Court of Maine first construed the statute as precluding incarceration
if the person were unable to pay and then held the statute unconstitu-
tional, stating:
These circumstances-honest indigency constituting inability to pay-
are new facts which are material to the right of the person . . . to
remain out of jail regardless of the existence, and non-payment, of his
civil obligation to pay money. Furthermore, these new facts-the
honest lack of property and consequent inability to pay-are without
necessary logical relationship to the adjudication of the existence, and
imposition, of the obligation to pay in the first instance.
It is irrelevant, therefore, that a capias execution follows prior adjudi-
cation of the existence of the obligation to pay money. Since the failure
to pay the obligation requires further adjudication as to new facts before
the body of the debtor can be legally available, in the ultimo, to be sub-
jected to incarceration for the benefit of the "creditor," procedural due
process-absent compelling special circumstances-requires that the
and stay proceedings on issues not severed); DiPietro v. Lavigne, 98 N.H. 294, 99 A.2d
413 (1954) (motion for new trial following granting of other party's motion for non-
suit). But see Gray v. Hall, 203 Cal. 306, 318, 265 P. 246, 253 (1928) ("The notice
essential to due course and process of law is the original notice whereby the court ac-
quires jurisdiction, and is not notice of the time when jurisdiction, already completely
vested, will be exercised").
91. E.g., IowA CoDE ANN. § 598.21 (Supp. 1975).
92. Moore v. Lee, 72 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1954); Franklin v. Bonner, 201 Iowa 516,
207 N.W. 778 (1926); Huger v. Huger, 313 Mich. 158, 20 N.W.2d 848 (1945); Wansley
v. Schmidt, 186 So. 2d 462 (Miss. 1966); Fernbaugh v. Clark, 236 Mo. App. 1200, 163
S.W.2d 999 (1942); Gitch v. Wright, 61 Utah 175, 211 P. 705 (1922).
93. Act of Dec. 1, 1959, ch. 317, § 300, [1959] Me. Laws 477, as amended, ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 722 (Supp. 1975).
94. 278 A.2d 379 (1971).
[-Vol. 1975:877
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/1
Vol. 1975:877] ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
"debtor" be given a hearing as to these new facts before he can be
deprived of his liberty.9 5
This element, a new question of law or fact, is equally present when
a judgment creditor seeks to subject specific assets of the judgment
debtor to satisfaction of the judgment. Among the exemption-related
questions in issue when a debtor seeks to defend against a taking of
his property to satisfy a judgment are (1) whether the property is of a
kind not subject to enforcement process, for example, wages; 96 (2)
whether a portion of the property is exempt from process;97 (3)
whether the debtor has had an opportunity to specify which of his prop-
erty should be taken to satisfy the judgment, if the statute gives him
that right;98 and (4) whether the debtor has had an opportunity to
select property he wishes to protect under a blanket exemption
statute.99 The existence of these questions, which the judgment debtor
95. Id. at 386-87 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). The plaintiff at-
tempted to distinguish Sniadach because the instant proceeding was postjudgment, while
Sniadach was prejudgment. The court rejected this argument as untenable because the
issues relevant to incarceration were not in issue in the proceedings that resulted in the
judgment. Id. See also In re Hallinan, 43 Cal. 2d 243, 272 P.2d 768 (1954) (notice
and hearing required before attorney can be disbarred by reason of his conviction of
a crime, when minimum elements of the crime did not necessarily involve moral turpi-
tude); In re Diesen, 173 Minn. 297, 215 N.W. 427 (1927) (same).
96. E.g., TEx. CONST. art. 16, § 28; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.11 (1961); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 42, § 886 (1966). See Edwards v. Stein, 94 N.J. Eq. 251, 119 A. 504 (Ch.
1923) (judgment debtor entitled to notice of levy so that he can show that the property
was not subject to levy) (due process not considered); State Nat'l Bank v. Lowenstein,
52 Okla. 259, 155 P. 1127 (1915) (prejudgment garnishment). In Union Pac. Ry. v.
Smersh, 22 Neb. 751, 755, 36 N.W. 139, 142 (1888), the court stated:
While the statute does not require notice to be given to the judgment debtor
in cases of garnishment after judgment, yet it is obvious that such notice should
be required in every case, and courts have undoubted authority to require such
notice to be given. Otherwise it would be possible for a garnishee to answer,
pay the amount owing by him to the debtor into court, and the court apply
the same to the payment of the debt without the judgment debtor having any
notice whatever.
97. E.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 561.2 (1950) (urban homestead not to exceed :V acre,
rural homestead not to exceed 40 acres); N.Y. CIV. PRAc. LAW § 5206(a) (McKinney
Supp. 1975) (homestead not to exceed $2000 in value); ORF. REv. STAT. § 23.160(1) (f)
(1973) (household furnishing not to exceed $400).
98. See note 13 supra.
99. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 52, § 13(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975) (not to exceed
$700); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2329.81 (Page 1954) ($500). See Mathis v. Purdy,
40 Fla. Supp. 17 (Dade County Cir. Ct. 1973). If the judgment debtor does not receive
notice of levy, not only will he have no opportunity to raise these questions, but he may
also lose his right to be present at the execution sale or to have a receiver appointed
to protect his interests. See Edwards v. Stein, 94 N.J. Eq. 251, 119 A. 504 (Ch. 1923).
Or the debtor may ultimately lose his right to redeem the property after it is sold in
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has had no opportunity to raise, casts doubt on the applicability of Endi-
cott when a judgment debtor is deprived of arguably exempt property.
In Endicott the property seized could not possibly have been claimed
as exempt, and neither the briefs of the parties nor the opinion of the
Court mentioned the possibility that any other new questions might be
raised in subsequent proceedings. 100 The existence of questions that
could not have been litigated in the original proceedings has caused
three Justices to observe:10 1
The Endicott rationale that a party who has litigated a case and had
a judgment taken against him is deemed, for purposes of due process,
to be on notice of further proceedings in the same action was rejected
in Griffin v. Griffin....
Does not Griffin point the way to the demands of due process in the
instant case? . . . Is there any more reason to accept in this case the
Endicott fiction of constructive notice because of knowledge of the
underlying judgment than there was in Griffin?102
I. DUE PROCESS AND EXEMPTIONS
A. Existence of a Property Interest
As a first step in the constitutional analysis, it must be determined
whether there is a deprivation of a constitutionally protected property
interest. The few courts that have considered the constitutionality of
exemption statutes have assumed that exempt property is entitled to
execution of judgment. See Harmer v. DeMarcus, 390 U.S. 736, 736 (1968) (Douglas,
J., dissenting). For protection of these rights, however, the judgment debtor needs no-
tice only before the execution sale, not before the levy.
100. For example, the debtor might wish to contest the creditor's affidavit in support
of the writ of garnishment. See Dunham, supra note 4, at 85 n.38. More generally,
other questions that might be raised for the first time include whether the judgment
debtor has already satisfied the judgment, in whole or in part, and whether the amount
claimed as "costs" (if costs are awarded by the court but not specified as to amount)
is correct. The existence of questions like these, coupled with the deprivation of prop-
erty entitled to due process protection, see text accompanying notes 105-38 infra, may
require notice and an opportunity for a hearing before any property is taken in satisfac-
tion of judgment.
101. Hanner v. DeMarcus, 390 U.S. 736, 741-42 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting),
noted in note 50 supra.
102. This existence of new questions was one of the reasons that prior notice and
hearing were required in Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., 392 F. Supp. 1023 (M.D. Fla.
1974). But see Raigoza v. Sperl, 34 Cal. App. 3d 560, 110 Cal. Rptr. 296 (1973) (ex-
istence of new questions not sufficient to require prior notice and hearing).
[Vol. 1975:877
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/1
Vol. 1975:877] ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS 899
the protections of due process. 103 No court has reasoned that after judg-
ment the debtor no longer has any interest in his property. Rather,
the focus has been on whether due process requires anything beyond
the notice and hearing that judgment debtor received when his liability
was determined and reduced to judgment. 04 This focus is correct.
The effect of an exemption statute is to confer on a judgment debtor
an immunity with respect to the specified property and to prevent any
of his judgment creditors' 0 5 from seizing the property. When a statute
provides that all non-exempt property is subject to execution, the clear
implication is that exempt property is not subject to execution; 10 6 in
103. Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., 392 F. Supp. 1023 (M.D. Fla. 1974); Langford
v. Tennessee, 356 F. Supp. 1163 (W.D. Tenn. 1973); Scott v. Danaher, 343 F. Supp.
1272 (N.D. I11. 1972); Moya v. DeBaca, 286 F. Supp. 606 (D.N.M. 1968), appeal dis-
missed. 395 U.S. 825 (1969); Phillips v. Bartolomie, 46 Cal. App. 3d 346, 121 Cal. Rptr.
56 (1975); Raigoza v. Speri, 34 Cal. App. 3d 560, 110 Cal. Rptr. 296 (1973); Mathis
v. Purdy, 40 Fla. Supp. 17 (Dade County Cir. Ct. 1973); Wilson v. Grimes, 232 Ga.
388, 207 S.E.2d 5 (1974). See Hanner v. DeMarcus, 390 U.S. 736, 736 (1968) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting). But see Taylor v. Madigan, 53 Cal. App. 3d 943, 126 Cal. Rptr. 376
(1975).
The cases also recognize that there is a "taking," though they disagree on whether
it is the levy or the subsequent sale that constitutes the taking. Compare Raigoza v.
Sperl, 34 Cal. App. 3d 560, 567, 110 Cal. Rptr. 296, 301 (1973) ("Without doubt, a
levy of execution involves a 'taking' in the sense that the debtor is deprived of an interest
in something of value against his will"), with Wood v. Atkinson, 231 Ga. 271, 271-72,
201 S.E.2d 394, 395 (1973), appeal dismissed, 416 U.S. 901 (1974):
The mere issuance and recording of an execution in the general execution
docket is not a "taking" of the property of the defendant in execution. The
defendant in execution is in no way deprived of the possession or use of his
property. Before a "taking" pursuant to the execution can be effected, it is
necessary that there be a levy pursuant to the execution and a sale by the levy-
ing officer.
104. E.g., Raigoza v. Sperl, 34 Cal. App. 3d 560, 567-68, 110 Cal. Rptr. 296, 301
(1973):
To characterize levies of execution as a "taking" is nonproductive. . . . The
focus . . . must be on the "process" and here the question is simple: Is it con-
sistent with due process to require the judgment debtor to apply for and prove
the right to an exemption after seizure, rather than to insist that the creditor
prove in a pre-seizure hearing that arguably exempt property is subject to levy?
105. Except those who have security interests in the specific asset or who fall into
some other favored class. See note 26 supra.
106. E.g., CAL. Crv. PRo. CODE § 688 (a) (Deering Supp. 1975):
All goods, chattels, moneys or other property, both real and personal, or any
interest therein, of the judgment debtor, not exempt by law, and all property
and rights of property levied upon under attachment in the action, are subject
to execution.
See also id. § 690(b): "Whenever it is specifically provided . . . that the filing of a
claim of exemption is not required, the property so mentioned. . . shall not be subject
to levy of attachment or execution in any manner."
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other words, a judgment creditor is disabled from subjecting exempt
property to satisfaction of his judgment. And when a judgment
debtor's asset is seized, even if only until it is determined that he is
entitled to the immunity, the debtor is deprived of existing interests in
his asset-he loses his rights to possess, use, and transfer clear title.
Sniadach and subsequent cases'0 7 leave no doubt that these interests
in property are entitled to the protections of due process.
It might be argued, however, that the proper focus is the exemption
rather than the asset, and that the threshold question is whether the
exemption statutes confer on a judgment debtor anything that may
properly be described as "property" within the meaning of the four-
teenth amendment. One of the limitations on the concept of property
is that a person may lose his interests in an asset to satisfy a judgment
that has been rendered against him. The exemption statutes provide an
exception to this limitation by conferring on a judgment debtor the right
to retain possession even as against a judgment creditor, and this right
may well be a property interest entitled to the protections of due proc-
ess.
The term used to describe an interest created by statutory grant and
protected by due process is "entitlement."'' 08 Whether an interest con-
stitutes an entitlement and, if so, whether the statute governing ter-
mination of the interest complies with due process are questions that
have been before the Supreme Court over a dozen times in recent
years. 109 The Court has held that such governmental grants as mone-
107. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); see
id. at 342 (Harlan, J., concurring); Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., 392 F. Supp. 1023,
1031 (M.D. Fla. 1974). Moreover, even in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600
(1974), in which the Court upheld a Louisiana prejudgment seizure statute, the Court
did not deny that the debtor's interest in the property was entitled to due process protee-
tion.
108. See cases cited note 109 infra. The concept of entitlement has replaced the
analysis based on whether the interest is a right or a privilege. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970); see Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. Rav. 1439 (1968); Comment, Entitlement, Enjoyment,
and Due Process of Law, 1974 DuKE L.J 89.
109. E.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975); Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379 (1975); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974); Dillard v. Industrial Comm'n, 416 U.S. 783 (1974); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416
U.S. 134 (1974); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973); Perry v. Sinderman, 408
U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer,




tary payments, 110 employment,"' parole from prison,1 2 education,"'
and drivers' licenses"14 are entitlements and therefore cannot be taken
without some procedural safeguards. Although the Court has not
attempted to define "entitlement," two common characteristics of
entitlements are that the interest must be presently enjoyed and that
deprivation of the interest must inflict grievous loss on the person
deprived of it.
The present enjoyment requirement was first invoked in dictum to
distinguish between taking away a right and refusing to grant the right
in the first place." 5  A few years later it was used to distinguish two
employment contract cases in which the results were held to depend
on whether, under the contracts of employment, the employees had a
right to renewal or a mere expectation of renewal." 6 In the exemption
context, it might be argued that a judgment debtor has no present en-
joyment of an exemption before the time the sheriff or the court deter-
mines the asset to be exempt. The essence of an exemption, how-
ever, is the debtor's right to continued possession and use of an
asset already in his possession." 7  Thus the interest of a judgment
debtor in exempt property is distinguishable from the interest of a
government employee in renewal of employment that is, by its terms,
for a limited period. Although the employee may be enjoying the
benefit of employment at the time the employment is not renewed, he
has neither an assurance of renewal of the benefit nor a right to renewal
Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Wy-
man v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
110. E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); see Mathews v. Eldridge, 96 S.
Ct. 893, 901-02 (1976).
111. E.g., Amett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S.
593 (1972).
112. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974) (good time credit to reduce period of incarceration).
113. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
114. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
115. Id.; accord, Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 408-09 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971) (distinguishing between revocation of parole and release
on parole). But see United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of
Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated as moot sub nom. Regan v. Johnson, 419
U.S. 1015 (1974), noted in 1974 WAsH. U.L.Q. 752.
116. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S.
593 (1972) (companion cases).
117. Or, with respect to wages, the right to acquire possession of them in accordance
with his contract of employment.
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of it.118 A judgment debtor, on the other hand, does have a statutory
right to retain the asset." 9 Consequently, he is in present enjoyment
of his interest.' 20
The factor of grievous loss has been recited in several opinions,'
1118. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972), the Court characterized
the employee's interest in renewal of his employment as "an abstract need or desire for
it."
119. An alternative construction of the exemption statutes is that the judgment debtor
has this assurance and this right only if he successfully claims the exemption. See Tay-
lor v. Madigan, 53 Cal. App. 3d 943, 966, 126 Cal. Rptr. 376, 391 (1975). Under this
construction, the delay necessary for determining whether the statutory requirements
are satisfied is implicit in the need for successfully claiming the exemption. The judg-
ment debtor, then, could not be deprived of any entitlement before his exemption claim
is allowed. This construction of the judgment debtor's interest is justified, however, only
if the procedural aspects of the exemption statute may be considered to define the inter-
est. The Supreme Court has rejected this approach. See text accompanying and follow-
ing notes 127-38 infra.
120. Moreover, at least one federal court appears to have limited the requirement of
present enjoyment. United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of
Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated as moot sub nom. Regan v. Johnson, 419
U.S. 1015 (1974). Earlier, in Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971), the Second Circuit had held that denial of parole without
notice and a hearing did not violate due process because the prisoner was not presently
enjoying liberty. Then in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Supreme Court
held that a person already on parole had an interest in liberty entitled to due process
protection. In Johnson, the Second Circuit stated that after Morrissey,
[plarole was thenceforth to be treated as a "conditional liberty," representing
an "interest" entitled to due process protection. A prisoner's interest in pro-
spective parole, or "conditional entitlement," must be treated in like fashion.
To hold otherwise would be to create a distinction too gossamer-thin to stand
close analysis. Whether the immediate issue be release or revocation, the
stakes are the same: conditional freedom versus incarceration.
500 F.2d at 928. The court in Johnson did not expressly renounce the present enjoy-
ment requirement, and it would be hard to conclude that in Morrissey the Supreme Court
abandoned the requirement, since the Court used the concept of present enjoyment in
subsequent cases. E.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sinder-
man, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (companion cases). Perhaps the Second Circuit contem-
plates a special rule for the return of an entitlement to a person Who previously has
been deprived of it. Or perhaps the court contemplates a special rule for entitlements
in the nature of liberty, which would not apply to entitlements in the nature of property.
See generally Van Alstyne, supra note 108; Comment, supra note 108.
121. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970) (brutal need); Torres v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 321 F. Supp. 432, 436-
37 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated and remanded, 402 U.S. 968, adhered to on remand, 333 F.
Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), afj'd mem., 405 U.S. 949 (1972). In Morrissey, the Court
stated: "Whether any procedural protections are due depends on the extent to which
an individual will be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss."' 408 U.S. at 481, quoting
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970). Recently, in upholding a statute that per-
mitted ex parte suspension of workmen's compensation benefits because the employee
could get automatic judicial enforcement of the original award, the Court stated that if
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/1
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but it probably is not an essential characteristic. A majority of the
Supreme Court has stated that the proper inquiry is the nature of the
interest, not its weight, and that so long as the deprivation is not de
minimis, the extent of the loss is irrelevant to the question whether
the interest being taken is "property."' 22 The other members of the
Court, while contending that the standard of grievous loss applies to
interests conferred by the state, have stated that the lesser standard of
de minimis loss applies to property disputes between private parties. 128
Admittedly, exemptions are benefits conferred by the state.'24 But a
dispute over a creditor's ability to reach a specific asset of a debtor
seems more a property dispute between private parties than a termina-
tion of a state-conferred benefit like employment, welfare benefits, or
a license. The deprivation in the exemption context is the loss of the
use of the asset pending a determination of the debtor's claim of
exemption. This is the very sort of deprivation that the Court in
Sniadach subjected to the requirements of due process, as Justice Har-
lan's concurring opinion makes clear. 25 And even if grievous loss is
a requirement, the purpose of exemptions-providing a judgment
debtor and his family with a minimum standard of living-suggests that
the legislature has concluded that deprivation of exempt assets would
inflict grievous loss on the judgment debtor and his family. 26 Thus
the interest of the judgment debtor has the characteristics of present
enjoyment and grievous loss.
An argument against finding an entitlement is that since the state
need not grant exemptions at all, it may therefore grant exemptions
the employee could actually get an automatic and immediate judgment, thereby rendering
the suspension of benefits nugatory, then any injury to the employee would be de mini-
mis and not "constitutionally significant." Dillard v. Industrial Comm'n, 416 U.S. 783,
794 (1974).
122. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575-76 (1975).
123. Id. at 588 n.5 (Powell, J., dissenting).
124. As, indeed, are all other property interests recognized and protected by statute
or judicial decision.
125. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969); see Brown v. Liberty
Loan Corp., 392 F. Supp. 1023, 1031 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
126. Of course, the courts may not be bound by this legislative determination and
may inquire into the severity of the loss in each case. Compare Vukowich, supra note
6, at 824, 827-28 (some exemption statutes preserve property for the debtor that is not
essential to maintaining a minimum standard of living), with Brown v. Liberty Loan
Corp., 392 F. Supp. 1023, 1032 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (garnishment of even nonexempt por-
tion of wages may cause grievous injury). See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 96 S. Ct. 893,
910 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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upon the reasonable condition that the judgment debtor apply for and
prove that he is entitled to them.127 Under this argument, since the
judgment debtor has no entitlement until he successfully claims an
exemption, due process is not denied if an asset is taken before that
time. Central to this argument is the view that the procedural aspects
of the statute conferring the benefit define the interest of the judgment
debtor.128  The basis for this view is Board of Regents v. Roth,120 in
which the Court held that state law, rather than the Constitution,
defined a property interest.'30 In Roth the interest was government
employment. Because neither the employment contract, the state stat-
ute, nor state policy contained any promise to renew the employment,
the Court held that the failure to renew the employment was not a
deprivation of a property interest entitled to due process protection.
But Roth concerned substantive aspects of the statute, and in subse-
quent cases the Supreme Court has refused to extend Roth to permit
127. None of the entitlement cases concerns litigation over a refusal to grant a gov-
ernmental benefit when there was no request for the benefit. Rather, the cases concern
either a termination of existing benefits or a refusal to approve a request for benefits.
E.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972); United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500
F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom. Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974).
One judge who found no due process problem did believe that an exemption statute
denied equal protection of the laws. Moya v. DeBaca, 286 F. Supp. 606, 613-14
(D.N.M. 1968) (dissenting opinion), appeal dismissed, 395 U.S. 825 (1969). Citing
a "veritable obstacle course" for a debtor to overcome to gain his exemptions, he found
discrimination against debtors:
The precise discrimination, as I see it, occurs in favoring and protecting cred-
itor interests, as against debtor interests in an arbitrary and unreasonable man-
ner in the light of expressed legislative and judicial purposes to the contrary,
and at exhorbitant [sic] social and financial cost to both the wage earner and
the community....
A valid law cannot give something . . . and then in effect take it away by
making its attainment difficult or unreasonable. Courts cannot, in the per-
formance of their duties, tolerate contradictions and paradoxes in the law.
When such differences exist between purpose and result of law, the evident fru-
ition is public disrespect for law and order. The Constitution, and especially
the Fourteenth Amendment, is the axe to hew down such incongruities.
Id. at 614. Contra, Taylor v. Madigan, 53 Cal. App. 3d 943, 126 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1975).
See also Abbit v. Bernier, 387 F. Supp. 57 (D. Conn. 1974) (incarceration of debtor
before opportunity to show indigency denies equal protection).
128. This argument was apparently adopted by the courts in Taylor v. Madigan, 53
Cal. App. 3d 943, 126 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1975), and Raigoza v. Sperl, 34 Cal. App. 3d
560, 567, 110 Cal. Rptr. 296, 301 (1973), but rejected by the court in Brown v. Liberty
Loan Corp., 392 F. Supp. 1023, 1037 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
129. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
130. Id. at 577-78.
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the interest to be defined by the procedural aspects of the legislation
creating it.
In Arnett v. Kennedy,' 3' the petitioner had been employed by the
government under a contract that permitted discharge only for cause.
The applicable regulations provided for thirty days notice before dis-
charge and an opportunity for the employee to respond to the
charges, but did not provide for an evidentiary hearing until after dis-
charge. In a five-to-four decision, the Court held this procedure com-
plied with due process. The case is important to the exemption prob-
lem primarily for the differing ways the Justices determined whether
the employee had an interest entitled to constitutional protection.
Three Justices believed that procedural aspects of the statute and regu-
lations could properly define the property interest of the employee.' 32
Since the regulations provided the procedural mechanism by which a
determination of discharge for cause could be made, the employ-
ee's property interest was qualified by these procedural limitations.
"[W]here the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined
with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in
determining that right, [the recipient] must take the bitter with the
sweet."1" '  Therefore, because the employee's property interest was
limited by the possibility of termination, he was not deprived of "prop-
erty." In the context of exemptions, this analysis could lead to the con-
clusion that the judgment debtor's interest is not entitled to due process
protection, since the statute prescribes how the judgment debtor will
obtain the benefit of the exemption.
The other six Justices, however, firmly rejected this method of deter-
mining whether the interest is entitled to due process protection. They
stated that the statute and regulations permitting discharge only for
cause created an entitlement that constituted "property" and that while
state law may define the substance of the interest, the Constitution
mandates the procedure by which that interest may be terminated.
These six Justices differed with each other, though, on the question
whether the regulations afforded due process for the deprivation of the
property. 134
131. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
132. Id. at 151-54 (Rehnquist & Stewart, JJ., Burger, C.J.).
133. Id. at 153-54.
134. Two Justices believed that the procedures complied with due process. Id. at 164,
167-71 (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., concurring). Of the four dissenting Justices, one
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The following year, in Goss v. Lopez,'3" students suspended from
public schools challenged the suspensions on the ground that they did
not receive notice and a hearing before the suspensions. Again a
minority of the Court, this time four Justices, took the position that the
interest of the students was defined by the state statutes that not only
conferred the benefit of free education, but also limited this benefit
by giving school administrators the right to suspend students for dis-
ciplinary reasons.' 8 6 The other five Justices disagreed: the right to
public education is an interest entitled to due process protection and
is not defined by the possibility that the right might be summarily sus-
pended.137  Thus suspension of the students without any opportunity
to them to explain their conduct violated due process.'1 8
As a result of Arnett and Goss, the interest of the judgment debtor
is not to be defined by the procedural aspects of the statute creating
exemptions. Therefore, even if the proper focus is the exemption
rather than the asset, the judgment debtor's interest in his assets, as
conferred by the exemption statutes, is "property" within the meaning
of the fourteenth amendment.
B. Notice and Hearing
The judgment debtor's interest in his exempt property is entitled to
the protections of due process, but what are those protections in the
thought that, although a full hearing before termination was not compelled, the pre-termi-
nation hearing provided by the statutes in question was deficient because it did not pro-
vide for determination by an impartial party. Id. at 171, 196-99 (White, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). The other three Justices stated that a full hearing should
precede termination. Id. at 206, 217-27 (Marshall, Douglas & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
135. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
136. Id. at 584, 586-87 (Powell, Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ., Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Of the three Justices who expressed the view in Arnett that the procedural aspects of
the statute could properly define the property interest, only two (Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Rehnquist) expressed this view in Goss. On the other hand, two who re-
jected this view in Arnett dissented in Goss (Justices Powell and Blackmun). These
were the two Justices who concurred in the result in Arnett because they believed that,
although the statute created an entitlement, the procedure for terminating that entitle-
ment comported with due process. Justice Stewart appears to have abandoned the posi-
tion that the property interest is defined by the procedural aspects of the statute.
137. 419 U.S. at 573-74.
138. If allowing an exemption is viewed as the initial grant of a benefit, Arnett and
Goss, which both dealt with the termination of existing government benefits, might be
distinguished from the exemption case. This distinction, however, is merely a repetition
of the present enj6yment requirement discussed earlier. See text accompanying notes
115-20 supra.
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context of exemptions?139 The Supreme Court has stated repeatedly
that the process required by the Constitution depends on a balancing
of all the relevant interests.'4 0  "mhe interpretation and application
of the Due Process Clause are intensely practical matters . . *..""I At
a minimum, due process requires notice and an opportunity for a hear-
ing,' 4 2 but the timing of the notice, as well as the nature of the
hearing, depend upon an appropriate accommodation of the competing
interests.143
139. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("Once it is deter-
mined that due process applies, the question remains what process is due"). In the ex-
emption context, the court in Raigoza v. Sperl, 34 Cal. App. 3d 560, 568, 110 Cal. Rptr.
296, 301 (1973), stated the question as "[ius it consistent with due process to require
the judgment debtor to apply for and prove the right to an exemption after seizure,
rather than to insist that the creditor prove in a pre-seizure hearing that arguably exempt
property is subject to levy?" The court thus combined two issues-the timing of the
hearing and the burden of proof at the hearing-into one.
140. E.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 556, 560-63 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82, 90 n.21 (1972); Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-71 (1970).
141. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578 (1975).
142. Id. at 579; Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168-69 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 313 (1950). Both requirements must be met. A statute authorizing notice but de-
nying any opportunity for a hearing has been held to deny due process. Windsor v.
McVeigh, 93 U.S. (3 Otto) 274, 277-78 (1876):
[N]otice is only for the purpose of affording the party an opportunity of being
heard upon the claim or the charges made . . . . A denial to a party of the
benefit of a notice would be in effect to deny that he is entitled to notice at
all, and the sham and deceptive proceeding had better be omitted altogether.
Accord, McVeigh v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 259 (1870).
Even a temporary taking of property must be accompanied by notice and an opportu-
nity for a hearing. E.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). But cf. Dil-
lard v. Industrial Comm'n, 416 U.S. 783 (1974) (an action of the industrial commission
in suspending unemployment compensation that is immediately and automatically revers-
ible in the state courts causes no constitutionally significant injury).
143. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975), citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972), Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961). Thus, in some situa-
tions the courts have upheld statutes that afford a hearing only after the taking has oc-
curred. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974); Mitchell
v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (incarceration for violation of conditions of
parole); United States v. Shaheen, 445 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1971) (temporary writ of ne
exeat republica); Halpern v. Austin, 385 F. Supp. 1009 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (three-judge
court) (garnishment of wages to provide alimony); Torres v. New York State Dep't of
Labor, 321 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated and remanded, 402 U.S. 968, adhered to
on remand, 333 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), affd mem., 405 U.S. 949 (1972); United
States v. Robbins, 235 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. Ark. 1964) (temporary ne exeat republica
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In Fuentes the debtor's interest in the property included the rights
of possession and use, and these interests were held sufficient to
require notice before deprivation. Absent an extraordinary situation
that would justify seizure before a hearing, the necessary accommoda-
tion of competing interests was to occur only with respect to the nature,
not the timing, of the hearing. In Mitchell, however, the accommoda-
tion of competing interests occurred with respect to the timing of the
hearing. Of course, determining whether the situation is extraordinary
-a determination necessitated by the approach in Fuentes-also
entails a balancing of the competing interests,' 4 4 but the criteria recited
in Fuentes differ from those in Mitchell.145
(1) Fuentes
In the context of exemptions, the Fuentes approach suggests that the
judgment debtor must be given an opportunity for a hearing before his
property is seized. The judgment debtor has an interest entitled to due
process protection, and the situation probably does not qualify as an
"extraordinary situation," as that term was used by the Court in
Fuentes. Three elements are common to extraordinary situations:
(1) seizure is "directly necessary to secure an important governmental
or general public interest," (2) there is "a special need for very prompt
action," and (3) the person initiating the seizure is a government offi-
will issue on ex parte showing of probable cause); Raigoza v. Sperl, 34 Cal. App. 3d
560, 110 Cal. Rptr. 296 (1973); Taylor v. Madigan, No. 443647 (Cal. Super. Ct., Aug.
21, 1974) (levy, but no sale, prior to notice), rev'd, 53 Cal. App. 3d 493, 126 Cal. Rptr.
376 (1975); Wood v. Atkinson, 231 Ga. 271, 201 S.E.2d 394 (1973), appeal dismissed,
416 U.S. 901 (1974); Edwards v. Stein, 94 N.J. Eq. 251, 119 A. 504 (Ch. 1923); cases
cited notes 143-46 infra. Contra, North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S.
601 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535
(1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969); Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1946); Hostrop v. Board of Junior
College Dist. No. 515, 471 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973);
Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., 392 F. Supp. 1023 (M.D. Fla. 1974); Scott v. Danaher,
343 F. Supp. 1272 (N.D. ll. 1972); Desmond v. Hachey, 315 F. Supp. 328 (D. Me.
1970); Yoder v. County of Cumberland, 278 A.2d 379 (Me. 1971); Mills v. Howard,
109 R.I. 125, 280 A.2d 101 (1971).
144. Note, Provisional Remedies and Due Process in Default-Mitchell V. W.T.
Grant Co., supra note 3, at 662.
145. It is not clear which approach the Court will use in the future. See North Ga.
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 676-80 (1974) (decided two days after Mitchell).
Consequently, the exemption problem will be analyzed under both approaches. See also
Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use




cial responsible for determining that the seizure is justified.146  In
Fuentes the Court rejected the notion that collection of a debt consti-
tutes a sufficiently important interest.' 4' Although collection of a judg-
ment may be more of an "important governmental interest" than collec-
tion of a debt, it is not the sort of governmental interest involved in
cases upholding prehearing seizures to protect large numbers of per-
148 '14 9 orsons against, for example, misbranded drugs,""' impure food, or a
bank failure.'5 0 On the other hand, to the extent that seizure to obtain
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction constitutes an extraordinary situation,151 it is
arguable that seizure to enforce a judgment does, too. In light of long-
arm statutes and expanded notions of jurisdiction, however, it may be
questioned whether seizure to obtain quasi-in-rem jurisdiction con-
tinues to serve an important governmental interest that cannot other-
wise be served. 52
With respect to the need for prompt action as a justification for pre-
hearing seizure, the Court suggested that the statute must at least limit
seizure to instances in which the creditor makes a showing of immedi-
ate danger of disposition by the debtor. 53 The execution statutes have
no such limitation. Finally, the person initiating the seizure is the judg-
ment creditor, not a government official. To the extent that the sheriff
exercises the power of refusing to seize property he determines is
exempt, there may be "effective state control"' 54 over the seizure. 155
146. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972). The Court also described these situ-
ations as "truly unusual." Id. at 90.
147. Id. at 92-93 & n.29.
148. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
149. North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
150. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947).
151. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
152. See Zammit, Quasi-in-Rem Jurisdiction: Outmoded and Unconstitutional?, 49
ST. JOHN's L. REv. 668 (1975); Note, Garnishment of Wages Prior to Judgment Is a
Denial of Due Process: The Sniadach Case and Its Implications for Related Areas of
the Law, supra note 3, at 1003-04; Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and Due Process
Requirements, 82 YALE LJ. 1023, 1031-36 (1973). But see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 91 n.23 (1972) (dictum) (securing jurisdiction is "clearly a most basic and impor-
tant public interest"); Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123 (3rd Cir. 1976) (suf-
ficient government interest but insufficient procedural safeguards for protection of de-
fendant's interests); Long v. Levinson, 374 F. Supp. 615 (S.D. Iowa 1974) (constitu-
tional); U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 348 F. Supp. 1004, 1020-23 (D. Del. 1972) (consti-
tutional).
153. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93 (1972).
154. Id.
155. But cf. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 690.50 (Deering Supp. 1975) (apparently with-
drawing the power from the sheriff). If the judgment creditor objects to the judgment
Vol. 1975:877] 909
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In some states, however, the sheriff acts at the direction of the judg-
ment creditor, and the purported protection for the judgment debtor
against execution on exempt property is a bond posted by the judgment
creditor. 5 In this situation there is no effective state control over the
seizure.157  Since execution of judgment is not an extraordinary situa-
tion, the approach in Fuentes leads to the conclusion that the oppor-
tunity for a hearing must precede the seizure of a judgment debtor's
property.
(2) Mitchell
To determine whether the Mitchell approach leads to the same
conclusion, the interests of the judgment creditor, the judgment debtor,
and the state must each be examined. The judgment creditor's interest
is obtaining prompt satisfaction of his judgment at minimum expense.
He has been wronged by the judgment debtor and has already been
put to the effort and expense of obtaining judgment. A notice require-
ment may cause delay or added expense and certainly increases the
risk that the judgment debtor may conceal or dispose of the specified
asset. Any delay would be in addition to the delay already caused by
statutory requirements that the execution sale be advertised for a speci-
fied period. 5 " But if the debtor claims no exemption, the delay need
be only a few days, too short a period to be of much significance to
the creditor. If the debtor does claim an exemption, the delay still
need be no longer than two weeks.' 50 In light of the rationale for most
debtor's claim of exemption, subsection (h) requires the sheriff to retain possession of
the asset until the court resolves the dispute.
156. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 83-84 (1972) (due process requires more
than a bond). The requirement of a bond provides little protection for the judgment
debtor. See text accompanying notes 180-82 infra.
157. There may not be effective state control even if the sheriff is supposed to refuse
a levy when an exemption is claimed. In Smith v. Pueblo Mercantile & Credit Ass'n,
82 Colo. 364, 260 P. 109 (1927), a creditor procured a writ of attachment, which the
sheriff levied on the debtor's car. The debtor claimed the car as exempt, but when the
creditor furnished a bond, the sheriff refused to release the car. The court held the sher-
iff liable, stating that he was not entitled to retain an asset until a debtor establishes
judicially that it is exempt. Although the sheriff's conduct was held to be improper,
the facts of the case suggest that, if the judgment creditor posts a bond, the sheriff may
not see any reason to make an impartial determination whether the asset is exempt.
158. E.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 626.74 (1950) (realty: 4 weeks; personalty: 3
weeks); PA. R. Cv. P. 3128-29 (realty: 3 weeks; personalty: 6 days). See also IND.
R. Ta. P. 69(A) (no sale until 6 months after lien arises).





exemptions-that the exempt property is necessary for the judgment
debtor's maintenance of a minimum standard of living- the creditor's
need for the proceeds from the arguably exempt property is usually less
immediate than the debtor's need for the use of the property. So long
as the creditor is assured that the property will be available later if it
is determined to be nonexempt, his principal interest is protected.
Nor should the increase in costs weigh substantially in the balance.
The Supreme Court has stated that mere expense does not justify dis-
pensing with the requirement of a prior hearing. 160 In any event, the
expense is not likely to be large. Since the notice need not be formal
service of process, but rather any means reasonably calculated to
inform,' the expense might consist of nothing more than the cost of
a printed form and postage. At first glance it might be thought that
the tandem requirement of affording the judgment debtor an oppor-
tunity for a hearing would substantially increase the costs of execution.
Since the judgment debtor may obtain a postlevy hearing under exist-
ing statutes, however, requiring an opportunity for a hearing before
levy would increase costs only if pre-levy hearings cost more than post-
levy hearings or if the requirement increased the instances in which
there were hearings on the issue of exemptions. There is no reason
for pre-levy hearings to cost more than postlevy hearings. There may
be an increase in the number of hearings, but not all of the resulting
increase in costs is relevant. Frequently, the judgment creditor should
reasonably be able to predict that the judgment debtor will prevail and
abandon his levy before the hearing. The increase in costs caused by
the failure of judgment creditors to abandon foreseeably futile efforts
is not a legitimate factor in the balance.
In some cases the judgment creditor will not be able to predict the
outcome of the hearing. Only the increase in cost attributable to these
160. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972):
A prior hearing always imposes some costs in time, effort, and expense, and
it is often more efficient to dispense with the opportunity for such a hearing.
But these rather ordinary costs cannot outweigh the constitutional right ...
Procedural due process is not intended to promote efficiency or accommodate
all possible interests: it is intended to protect the particular interests of the
person whose possessions are about to be taken.
See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971): "[Aldditional expense occasioned by the
expanded hearing [is not] sufficient to withstand the constitutional requirement."
161. Compare the cases holding that the notice required before modification of di-
vorce decrees need not be by personal service, note 82 supra. See Dunham, supra note
4, at 99-101.
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cases needs to be justified. The magnitude of the costs in these cases
must be considered in light of (1) the number of instances in which
the judgment creditor defeats the judgment debtor's claim of exemp-
tion; (2) the number of instances in which the judgment debtor obtains
an exemption in spite of an objection by the judgment creditor; and
(3) the number of instances in which, as a result of the requirement,
the judgment debtor obtains an exemption without any objection by the
judgment creditor. Only if the first category is sufficiently greater than
the sum of the other two could it be said that the direct costs of a hear-
ing requirement might not be justified.'6 2
Although the delay and the expense caused by providing notice and
an opportunity for a hearing are probably not substantial, the increase
in risk to the judgment creditor that he may never levy on the property
subject to execution is not so easily disposed of. This risk, recited by
the Court in Endicott,"6 is substantial because of the temptation for
a judgment debtor to protect his property. The risk of concealment
or disposition was not sufficient to induce the Court to uphold the pre-
judgment seizure in Fuentes.'64  In Mitchell, on the other hand, the
risk of disappearance of the property and also the risk of depreciation
in the value of the property were considered important. 165 The prob-
162. And only then should the judgment creditor's expense in defeating an exemption
claim be considered. Another undesirable cost would occur if the existence of a hearing
requirement deterred judgment creditors from executing on nonexempt property. Cf.
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (requiring a hear-
ing before discharge may deter warranted discharges).
For an economic and legal analysis of the need for notice and hearing for prejudgment
remedies, see Scott, Constitutional Regulation of Provisional Creditor Remedies: The
Cost of Procedural Due Process, 61 VA. L. Rav. 807 (1975).
163. 266 U.S. at 290. The Court was referring to Ketcham v. Kent Circuit Judge,
115 Mich. 60, 63, 72 N.W. 1110, 1111-12 (1897), a prejudgment garnishment case, in
which the Michigan court stated, "the very advantage sought by the writ would possibly
be of no avail, as a disposition could be made of the fund or property before service
could be had."
164. Nor was it sufficient in Di-Chem or Sniadach, though Sniadach might be distin-
guished on the ground that a debtor is not as likely to quit his job to disable his creditors
from locating leviable property as he is to conceal or dispose of his other assets. Re-
ferring to Sniadach, however, Justice White later stated that "while it was true that the
inability to garnish wages could leave the creditor uncompensated, if the defendant
proved judgment proof, this was a risk the creditor assumed at the outset by being un-
secured." Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 193 (1974) (concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). The same is true of postjudgment garnishment or execution, but only
with respect to judgments based on breach of contract and not judgments obtained to
redress other wrongs.
165. In the exemption context, the factor of depreciation may be insignificant be-
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lem in the exemption context, however, is distinguishable from the
problem in Mitchell. In Mitchell the debtor had expressly given the
creditor a security interest in the specific asset the creditor sought to
seize, whereas in the exemption context, the judgment creditor has no
prior interest in the specific asset.106 Still, the risk of disappearance
may be greater after judgment than before, and the judgment creditor's
interest in preventing concealment or disposition of assets subject to
execution is a legitimate and substantial factor in determining the
requirements of due process.
The judgment debtor's interests include enjoyment of the rights of
possession and use that the state has decided he should have even
though a judgment has been rendered against him. Because exemp-
tions are intended to permit a judgment debtor to retain assets
necessary for the maintenance of a minimum standard of living, the
deprivation of certain assets that may be claimed as exempt is likely
to have a very disruptive effect on the life of the debtor and those per-
sons dependent upon him.167  Of course, some items declared exempt
are likely to be more necessary to subsistence than others, and the
actual necessity of a given exemption probably varies from person to
person. 6 ' In addition to his interest in consuming exempt assets, the
cause the time necessary for determining whether the asset is exempt need not be long.
In the context of prejudgment seizures, on the other hand, the time necessary for deter-
mining whether the creditor is entitled to judgment on the underlying claim is substan-
tial.
166. See Comment, Justice White's Chemistry: The Mitchellization of Fuentes, 50
WASH. L. REV. 901, 908-13 (1975). If the judgment creditor has a security interest in
the asset he seeks to levy on, the judgment debtor would not be able to claim an ex-
emption in that asset. See note 26 supra.
The judgment creditor may have a judgment or execution lien on the asset. See note
16 supra. In most states no lien on personalty arises before levy. Thus at the time
of levy, the judgment creditor has no property interest in the asset. See note 213 infra.
167. See Vukowich, supra note 6, at 817 (wages), 826 (household furnishings), 829
(automobiles). Deprivation of some exempt assets, such as insurance, will not have a
disruptive effect on the daily life of the judgment debtor. In Randone v. Appellate
Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S.
924 (1972), the court held a prejudgment attachment statute unconstitutional and stated
that even if attachment were justified by extraordinary circumstances, it would still be
impermissible to attach assets necessary to enable the defendant "to live, to work, to
support his family or to litigate the pending action." Id. at 562, 488 P.2d at 30, 96
Cal. Rptr. at 726.
168. In Mitchell the impact of taking a stove and a stereo was thought insufficient
to require a hearing before the seizure. The impact on the debtor was outweighed, in
the Court's balance, by the potential impact on the creditor and by the procedural safe-
guards for the debtor in the statute being considered. 416 U.S. at 610. The impact
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judgment debtor has an interest in using some exempt assets, such as
tools of trade or an automobile, to produce additional assets.100 The
judgment debtor also has an interest in being able to encumber his
property, perhaps to acquire additional exempt property, and an inter-
est in being able to dispose of his property, for example, to replace
items that wear out. Neither the power to dispose nor the power to
encumber, however, is essential to the purpose of the exemption stat-
utes. Since there is a substantial risk that the exercise of these powers
will result in the creditor's never being able to obtain satisfaction, the
judgment debtor's interests in being able to encumber and dispose are
not entitled to much weight. 10 Finally, the judgment debtor has an
interest in preventing an erroneous taking in the first place. 7 1
For the most part, the interests of the state coincide with the interests
of the debtor and the creditor. Thus, the state's interests include
on the judgment creditor has been discussed above. See text accompanying notes 158-
66 supra. The sufficiency of the procedural protections is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 174-82 infra. See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972)
(severity of the impact on the debtor relevant to the nature of the hearing but not the
timing of the hearing).
169. See Vukowich, note 6 supra, at 786.
170. Accordingly, courts should reject any claim of denial of due process in connec-
tion with the lien on realty that arises in most states when a judgment is docketed. See
note 16 supra. Under a balancing approach, this interference with the judgment debt-
or's property rights-limiting only his power to convey clear title-is justified. See
Note, Procedural Due Process-The Prior Hearing Rule and the Demise of Ex Parte
Remedies, 53 B.U.L. Rv. 41, 64 (1973); Note, Garnishment of Wages Prior to Judg-
ment Is a Denial of Due Process: The Sniadach Case and Its Implications for Related
Areas of the Law, supra note 3, at 1000. Compare In re Northwest Homes of Chehalis,
Inc., 526 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1975) (prejudgment attachment of realty, insufficient inter-
ference with debtor's rights to constitute deprivation of property), Central Security Nat'l
Bank v. Royal Homes, Inc. 371 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (same), and
Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100, 102 (D. Conn. 1971) (same), with
Terranova v. Avco Fin. Servs., 396 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Vt. 1975) (three-judge court)
(prejudgment attachment of realty, unconstitutional), Bay State Harness Horse Racing
& Breeding Ass'n v. PPG Indus., 365 F. Supp. 1299, 1304-06 (D. Mass. 1973) (same),
and Gunter v. Merchants Warren Nat'l Bank, 360 F. Supp. 1085, 1090 (D. Me. 1973)
(three-judge court) ("In light of the principles of due process enunciated in Fuentes,
it cannot be said that the right of an owner of real estate to alienate his property is
not a 'significant property interest,' the deprivation of which is within the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection"). See also Ruocco v. Brinker, 380 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Fla.
1974) (three-judge court) (mechanics' lien statute constitutional); Spielman-Fond, Inc.
v. Hanson's, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 997 (D. Ariz. 1973) (three-judge court), aff'd mem.,
417 U.S. 901 (1974) (mechanics' lien statute does not entail a sufficient deprivation to
require prior notice and hearing).
171. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975) (a prior hearing is a "meaning.
ful hedge against erroneous action").
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enforcement of judgments,'172 maintenance of the integrity of the judi-
cial process by preventing dispositions that frustrate judicial decisions,
and provision to judgment debtors of the means to subsist and to con-
tinue being productive members of society.1 73 Beyond these, the state
has the additional interest of minimizing the burden on its courts and
other agencies.
Thus the principal interests to be accommodated are the collection
of judgments by judgment creditors and the maintenance of a minimum
standard of living by judgment debtors. Mitchell suggests that for an
accommodation of these interests to permit seizure without prior notice,
the statute must contain safeguards to minimize both the risk and the
impact of an erroneous seizure. 174 The statute upheld in Mitchell pro-
vided for issuance of the process only by a judge and only if the specific
facts justifying the seizure clearly appeared in the creditor's request.
The statute also provided for prompt review by a judge, with the bur-
den of proof on the creditor, and required a bond by the creditor. Exe-
cution and exemption statutes do not contain these or other sufficient
safeguards.
First, the execution and exemption process is not under the control
of a judge. The sheriff, who is in control, may not have the power,
or may not exercise the power, to refuse the judgment creditor's direc-
tion to levy on property that the judgment debtor claims as exempt. 7 5
If the sheriff is under the direction of the judgment creditor, he is not
a neutral government official. Nor does the seizure depend upon a
clear showing of specific facts, including the nonexempt nature of the
property, 76 that justify the seizure. Second, few statutes require prompt
172. The state's interest includes avoiding the possibility that the procedures would
deter judgment creditors from attempting to procure levy on nonexempt property. See
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (prior evidentiary
hearing may deter warranted discharge from employment).
173. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970) (welfare payments pro-
vide the means for daily subsistence and guard against societal malaise).
174. 416 U.S. at 608, 610, 616-18. Justice White, who wrote the Court's opinion in
Mitchell, foreshadowed the Court's approach in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 188-89
(1974) (concurring in part and dissenting in part). In that case Justice White described
the situations in which prehearing seizures have been upheld as having two factors in
common: first, a preseizure hearing might defeat the legitimate interest of the party op-
posing a prior hearing, and second, the statutory procedure is designed to minimize the
chances of an erroneous taking and provides for compensation in the event of error.
175. See notes 155-57 supra.
176. See note 209 infra.
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review by a judge, and none places'the burden of proof on the judg-
ment creditor. Third, not all states require the judgment creditor to
furnish a bond. Moreover, the requirement of a bond does not effec-
tively minimize either the risk or the impact of an erroneous levy. As
the Supreme Court stated in Fuentes, the requirement of a bond is not
a satisfactory answer to a due process claim because the requirement
tests only the strength of the creditor's belief in the merits of his ac-
tion;177 it does not effectively deter the creditor from erroneously deter-
mining that he is likely to succeed on the merits.""' Nor did the exist-
ence of bond and counterbond provisions prevent the Court from hold-
ing the Georgia garnishment statute unconstitutional in North Georgia
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.'7 9  In addition, a bond may not
compensate the judgment debtor even if the judgment creditor's
determination is erroneous. If the judgment debtor must file an
exemption claim, that is, if the asset is not automatically exempt, then
the initial seizure may not be wrongful under the statute. If the seizure
is not wrongful, the bond provides no relief for the judgment debtor.
And even if the levy is wrongful under the statute, the judgment
debtor acquires only a claim against the surety. He still has to
establish the monetary loss caused by the deprivation of the use of
the asset and must convince the surety to pay or must incur the burden
of litigation with the surety.8 ° Fourth, although the risk of error may
be reduced by giving the judgment debtor the power to specify the
order in which his property should be levied on, this protection is not
sufficient. Statutes giving the debtor the power of selection do not dis-
able the sheriff, if he cannot readily locate the judgment debtor at the
177. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 83-84 (1972); cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134, 169, 189-90 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring, and White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). If the creditor is willing to gamble on the possibility that the
debtor will not object to the taking, a bond requirement does not test even the strength
of the creditor's belief in his claim. See Fuentes v. Shevin, supra at 83 n.13.
178. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975) (prior notice and informal hearing
provide a "meaningful hedge against erroneous action"); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134, 214 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (possibility of error too great); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970) (possibility of honest error or irritable misjudgment);
Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., 392 F. Supp. 1023, 1033 (M.D. Fla. 1974). The exist-
ence of a cause of action for wrongful execution does not eliminate the need for prior
notice and hearing. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1972); Brown v. Liberty
Loan Corp., supra at 1033.
179. 419 U.S. 601, 608-09 (1975).
180. See Note, Provisional Remedies and Due Process in Default-Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., supra note 3, at 677-80.
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time of levy, from levying on whatever property he can find.181  And
finally, the risk of execution on exempt property is increased by the
power of the judgment debtor to waive his exemptions by not claiming
them. If the judgment debtor may waive an exemption by not claiming
it, then the creditor has no incentive to refrain from directing the sheriff
to levy on property that the debtor must affirmatively claim as exempt.
For all the above reasons, the execution and exemption procedures are
ineffective to minimize the risk and the impact of an erroneous seizure,
and the Mitchell analysis thus leads to the conclusion that existing stat-
utes have not made a permissible accommodation of the competing in-
terests.18 2
(3) Mathews v. Eldridge
The recent decision in Mathews v. Eldridge"s3 does not affect this
conclusion that existing execution statutes are unconstitutional. In
Mathews a recipient of disability payments under the Social Security
Act'8 ' challenged the procedures for terminating those payments. Be-
fore terminating disability benefits, the agency 8 ' must inform the re-
cipient of its tentative decision and provide him with a summary of the
evidence upon which that decision is based.'8 6  The agency must also
permit him to review the evidence in his file, respond in writing to the
proposed decision, and present additional evidence. 8 7  Holding that
181. See Dickinson v. Comstock, 199 S.W. 863 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1917) (evidence
would support finding that sheriff exercised due diligence).
182. With respect to the timing of hearings, the Court has stated:
Where only property rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial
inquiry is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity given for the ultimate
judicial determination of the liability is adequate .... Delay in the judicial
determination of property rights is not uncommon where it is essential that
governmental needs be immediately satisfied.
Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931). See Ewing v. Mytinger & Cas-
selberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1950). The last sentence of this passage means
that before postponement of a hearing is constitutionally permissible, there must be suffi-
cient governmental (or perhaps creditor) interests to make the situation "extraordinary."
See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-93 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395
U.S. 337, 339 (1969). See also Note, Provisional Remedies and Due Process in De-
fault-Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., supra note 3, at 662-63.
183. 96 S. Ct. 898 (1976).
184. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1970).
185. State and federal agencies jointly administer the program. See 96 S. Ct. at 903-
05.
186. Id. at904.
187. Id.; cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 143-44 (1974) (30 days notice and
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these procedures satisfy due process, the Court refused to require a
full evidentiary hearing before termination of the benefits. Mathews
provides no support for the constitutionality of execution statutes, how-
ever, because the statutory procedures for enforcing judgments are so
readily distinguishable: they do not require notice that levy is about
to occur, and the judgment debtor does not have any opportunity to
prevent the levy. Instead, the judgment debtor may attack the depri-
vation only after it has occurred.
Although Mathews provides no support for the constitutionality of
existing execution statutes, it may be suggestive of the minimum pro-
cedures necessary to satisfy due process. The Court observed that only
in Goldberg v. Kelly'88 had it required an evidentiary hearing before
a temporary deprivation of property.19  Goldberg, however, was dis-
tinguished because it concerned welfare assistance available only to
persons "on the very margin of subsistence."' 90 The Court viewed ter-
mination of welfare benefits as imposing greater hardship than termina-
tion of disability payments because welfare benefits are provided only
to those who demonstrate financial need.' Disability payments, on
the other hand, are provided regardless of need, and a recipient of dis-
ability payments may have other sources of income, such as earnings
of other family members, workmen's compensation or tort claims
awards, savings, insurance, or pensions.' In addition, the Court
noted, a person deprived of disability payments may become eligible
for other forms of public assistance, such as state and local welfare and
federal food stamps.'93 Consequently, "the disabled worker's need is
likely to be less than that of a welfare recipient.' ' 4
In the context of enforcement of judgments, the significance of the
Court's attempt to distinguish disability benefits from welfare benefits
is unclear. The Court could conclude that exemptions are more analo-
gous to disability payments than to welfare payments. First, in some
states, exemptions enable a person to enjoy a standard of living higher
opportunity to respond orally or in writing before termination of government employ-
ment).
188. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
189. 96 S. Ct. at 902, 905.
190. Id. at 905.
191. Id. at 905-06.
192. Id.





than mere subsistence, and a deprivation of some exemptions might
not drive the debtor below a subsistence level. In other states, how-
ever, exemptions do not provide even subsistence. 195 The Court thus
might make distinctions based on a determination whether a given ex-
emption is necessary for subsistence.196 Second, like the recipient of
disability assistance, a judgment debtor deprived of all the property in
his possession may still have a residual means of support, for example,
wages. The existence of a continuing source of support might distin-
guish a judgment debtor from a welfare recipient whose benefits have
been terminated. Of course, if the judgment is not satisfied out of as-
sets then in the possession of the debtor, the creditor may look to prop-
erty acquired in the future, except to the extent it is exempt. The
difficulty with a distinction based on the existence of a residual means
of support is that the problem in the context of exemptions is precisely
the deprivation of this residuum.
On the other hand, the Court could easily conclude that exemptions
are more analogous to welfare assistance than to disability payments.
Granted, eligibility for exemptions may not depend on financial
need, 9 7 but since all nonexempt property may be taken, exempt prop-
erty constitutes the minimum quantum of assets not available to credi-
tors. Inasmuch as exemptions are designed to permit the judgment
debtor's continued subsistence, they serve the same purpose as welfare.
Persons deprived of all their property may be eligible for welfare assist-
ance, but exemptions are designed to keep persons off the welfare
rolls. 9 This line of reasoning, then, suggests that with respect to pro-
cedural due process, exemptions should be treated like welfare bene-
fits.
In addition to the impact of the deprivation, the Court in Mathews
considered the risk of error under the existing procedures and the in-
195. See, e.g., Karlen, supra note 10, at 1169.
196. But see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 88-90 & nn.20-21 (1972) (necessity may
be relevant to the form of hearing, but does not affect the need for some kind of hearing
before even a temporary deprivation).
197. But cf. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw § 5205(a)(5) (McKinney 1963) (furniture ex-
empt only if necessary for the debtor and family). See generally Vukowich, supra note
6, at 845-48.
198. Southwest State Bank v. Quinn, 198 Kan. 359, 363, 424 P.2d 620, 624 (1967):
The whole purpose and policy of our exemption laws has been to secure to an
unfortunate debtor the means to support himself and his family, to keep them
from being reduced to absolute destitution and thereby public charges.
See sources cited in Vukowich, supra note 6, at 786 n.38.
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terest of the government in avoiding new procedural burdens.10 9 Again
distinguishing Goldberg, the Court described the decision to terminate
disability payments as "a more sharply focused and easily documented
decision than the typical determination of welfare entitlement." 2°0
Since credibility of witnesses, according to the Court, was not a factor
in most disability cases,201 the Court held that the statute's procedural
protections satisfied due process even though they afforded an oppor-
tunity to respond only in writing.20 2 In Mitchell, too, the Court looked
to the suitability of deciding the matter on documentary evidence.203
Mathews and Mitchell may imply that when the deprivation depends
on an easily documented fact about which persons might disagree but
would not lie, a full evidentiary hearing may be postponed until after
the deprivation. 20 4
Nevertheless, it may be necessary to provide some opportunity to re-
spond before the deprivation occurs.20 5 In Mathews the issue was only
199. 96 S. Ct. at 907-09. The Court's approach was consistent with its approach in
Mitchell of determining whether the statute made a permissible accommodation of the
competing interests. In Mitchell the competing interests were those of debtor and cred-
itor; in Mathews, of recipient and government (as grantor of benefits). The additional
burden of the new procedural safeguards was a factor in both cases. In Mathews this
burden would fall entirely on the government, because it was both the adverse party and
the decisionmaker. In Mitchell, on the other hand, this burden would be split between
the creditor, as adverse party, and the government, as decisionmaker. The Court's focus
in Mathews was primarily on the additional cost to be imposed on the government as
adverse party, rather than as decisionmaker. See 96 S. Ct. at 909:
Significantly, the cost of protecting those whom the preliminary administrative
process has identified as likely to be found undeserving may in the end come
out of the pockets of the deserving since resources available for any par-
ticular program of social welfare are not unlimited.
In the context of exemptions, the focus would be, as in Mitchell, on the creditor rather
than the government. For a discussion of whether the additional cost to the judgment
creditor justifies dispensing with prior notice and hearing, see text accompanying notes
160-62 supra.
200. 96 S. Ct. at 907.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 908-10.
203. 416 U.S. at 609-10, 617-18. See Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA.
L. REv. 1267, 1281 (1975).
204. An additional factor in Mathews was the presence of an administrative agency:
In assessing what process is due in this case, substantial weight must be given
to the good-faith judgments of the individuals charged by Congress with the
administration of the social welfare system that the procedures they have pro-
vided assure fair consideration of the entitlement claims of individuals.
96 S. Ct. at 909, citing Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 202 (1974) (White, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
205. See Friendly, note 203 supra.
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the nature of the prior hearing, not the necessity of a prior hearing
of some kind, whether written or oral. The impact of the deprivation on
the recipient and the risk of error under existing procedures were con-
sidered in connection with the nature of the hearing. This approach is
consistent with the idea, present in Fuentes,2"" that these factors are
relevant to the nature, but not the timing, of the hearing. In Arnett v.
Kennedy2" 7 the Court upheld procedures for terminating government
employment, even though they did not provide for a full evidentiary
hearing before termination. But as in Mathews, the procedures in Ar-
nett did provide for notice and some opportunity to respond before the
deprivation.
Mathews and Arnett thus stand for the proposition that if a prior
hearing is constitutionally compelled, it need not be a full evidentiary
hearing. They do not, however, resolve the question whether a prior
hearing is necessary in the context of exemptions. Nor does Mitchell.
Since the statute upheld in Mitchell did not provide for any notice or
an opportunity for any kind of presentation by the debtor before his
property was taken, an execution statute might be constitutional if it
(1) minimizes the risk of initial error by permitting levy only after a
determination by a neutral decisionmaker 20 8 based on an allegation of
specific facts justifying levy on specified property; 09 (2) minimizes the
impact of the deprivation by providing for prompt judicial review210
206. 407 U.S. at 83-84, 88-90 & n.21.
207. 416 U.S. 134 (1974), discussed in text accompanying notes 131-34 supra. The
procedures upheld in Arnett required 30 days notice of a proposed termination and
provided an opportunity for the employee to respond orally and in writing before ter-
mination.
208. For discussion of whether the neutral decisionmaker must be a judge, see note
49 supra. Even if the decisionmaker need not be a judge, the sheriff probably does not
qualify as neutral. See text accompanying notes 154-57 supra. In Mathews the deci-
sionmaker was a neutral, expert administrative agency. See 96 S. Ct. at 909-10. The
decisionmaker thus was not an adverse party (like a judgment creditor), or one under
the control of an adverse party (like a sheriff), or one who acts without exercising his
judgment (like a court clerk). See also North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,
419 U.S. 601, 619 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("so long as the court officer is
not an agent of the creditor").
209. A question exists whether the specific facts that would have to be established
would include the nonexempt nature of the property. According to Mitchell, the pre-
seizure inquiry may properly be limited to determining who is entitled to possession
pending resolution of the underlying dispute. 416 U.S. 600, 607 (1974). But the Court
also referred to a requirement that the creditor establish the probability that he will suc-
ceed on the merits. Id. at 609. Consequently, the judgment creditor should have to
establish the probability that the property he seeks to reach is not exempt.
210. In Mathews the Court noted the "torpidity of [the] administrative review
process," 96 S. Ct. at 906, but concluded that due process was satisfied by prior notice
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(perhaps with the burden of proof on the judgment creditor);21 and
(3) protects the judgment debtor against loss in the event the taking
was wrongful (by requiring the judgment creditor to furnish a
bond).212
Even a statute with these procedural safeguards, however, might not
suffice. In Mitchell, the creditor's purchase money security interest
gave him an interest in the debtor's property; this duality of interest
is not present in the context of execution on arguably exempt prop-
erty.21 3 Thus, because the facts in the exemption context are readily
and hearing before an administrative agency. Id. at 909-70. In Mitchell there was no
prior notice or hearing. Thus it may be that when there is no notice before the depriva-
tion, the review must be prompt; when there is notice and an opportunity for a hearing
before the deprivation, the review need not be so prompt.
211. See Jonnet v. Dollar Sav. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1130 (3d Cir. 1976); Sugar v.
Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp. 643, 648-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (three-judge court),
remanded with directions to abstain sub nom. Carey v. Sugar, 96 S. Ct. 1208 (1976).
212. Compare the statute in Mathews, which provides that if the termination of dis-
ability benefits is wrongful, the recipient is entitled to retroactive payments. 96 S. Ct.
at 905, citing 42 U.S.C. § 404 (1970). It may also be necessary to provide that the
judgment debtor may regain possession of the property if he posts a counterbond. See
North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 612 (1975) (Powell, I., con-
curring):
Since the garnished assets may bear no relation to the controversy giving rise
to the alleged debt, the State also should provide the debtor an opportunity to
free those assets by posting adequate security in their place.
For reasons why a creditor's bond does not adequately protect the debtor, see text ac-
companying notes 178-81 supra.
213. See Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp. 643, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(three-judge court), remanded with directions to abstain sub nom. Carey v. Sugar, 96
S. Ct. 1208 (1976).
In most states a successful plaintiff acquires a judgment lien on the judgment debtor's
realty. In three states he also acquires a judgment lien on personalty, but in the other
states he does not acquire a lien on personalty until some time at or after he obtains
a writ of execution. See REsENFELD, supra note 11, at 94-95, 155; note 16 supra.
These liens do not create the same duality of interest that a consensual security interest
creates. A security interest gives a creditor rights in property he would not otherwise
have-he has a lien to determine his priority as against other creditors and he has a
right to take the property before he obtains judgment against the debtor. See UNIFORMu
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503, held constitutional in Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l
Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974). A judgment or
execution lien, on the other hand, does not enable the creditor to reach property he
would not otherwise be able to subject to satisfaction of his judgment; nor does it accel-
erate the time when he can reach the property, although it does fix his priority as against
other creditors. The creation of a judicial lien probably is not a sufficient deprivation
to trigger the requirements of prior notice and hearing. See note 170 supra. But to
say that the existence of the lien justifies depriving the judgment debtor of possession
is to indulge in a bootstrap argument.
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distinguishable from those in recent Supreme Court cases, it is unclear
whether due process requires notice and an opportunity for a hearing
before a judgment debtor may be deprived of arguably exempt prop-
erty.214 It is clear, however, that existing statutes, which do not pro-
vide for any notice or hearing before levy, do not meet current stand-
ards of due process.
IV. A PROPOSAL
The foregoing analysis suggests that the hearing should be provided
before the debtor is deprived of the use of the property. The principal
interests to be considered are the judgment creditor's interest in not
letting the property disappear and the judgment debtor's interest in not
being deprived of the use of the property before a determination that
he is not entitled to retain it. It is perfectly possible to accommodate
both of these interests. Exemption procedures that fail to do so
are unwise,2 15 if not unconstitutional, and states should replace them
with procedures that do accommodate both interests.
A person's rights of ownership include the rights to possession, use,
and alienation. The principal interests of both parties could be satis-
fied by permitting the debtor to have relatively free possession and use
of the asset but restricting his power to transfer it. A state could pro-
tect both interests by revising its execution statutes to provide that levy
is to be made by serving notice on the judgment debtor,21 6 rather than
by seizing the asset, and that one of the incidents of levy is an injunction
against the judgment debtor's secreting or disposing217 of the asset
levied upon .21  For violation of this injunction, the debtor would be
214. For an analysis concluding that prior notice is not necessary, see Dunham, supra
note 4 (but notice is necessary before final disposition of the property).
215. See Moya v. DeBaca, 286 F. Supp. 606, 613-14 (D.N.M. 1968) (dissenting
opinion), appeal dismissed, 395 U.S. 825 (1969).
216. It would not be necessary to obtain personal service. See note 82 supra. If
personal service cannot be made on the judgment debtor, levy could be made by leaving
the notice with someone else at the debtor's principal place of residence or by sending
the notice by certified or registered mail. Cf. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAw § 308(2) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1975) (service of process by leaving process at defendant's place of residence
and mailing copy to defendant).
217. The injunction against disposition would prohibit converting the asset into prop-
erty that qualifies for an exemption. See CAL. Cv. PRo. CODE § 690.7 (Deering 1973)
(exempting $1000 deposited in a savings and loan institution).
218. An alternative approach would be to provide for levy by notice, as above, but
provide for an ex parte injunction only if the judgment creditor requests it. Cf. Law
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subject to punishment for contempt. The effect of levy by notice
instead of seizure would be to permit the judgment debtor to continue
using the asset. The effect of the injunction would be to ensure that
the asset is available to satisfy the judgment if the asset is not exempt.
For most judgment debtors, the order not to conceal or dispose of the
asset probably would suffice. For the others, incarceration for the con-
tempt probably would result in pro tanto satisfaction of the judgment:
if the judgment debtor has concealed the asset or has given or sold it
to a friend or relative, he will almost always produce it to obtain his
release from jail; if he has sold it to a stranger, he will produce the
proceeds unless he no longer has them.21 9
If a judgment debtor violates the injunction, the judgment creditor
the state would have the additional burden of the contempt proceed-
ings. This burden might be substantial, 210 but it might not-the only
issues in the contempt proceedings would be whether the judgment
debtor had possession of the asset at the time of levy, whether he failed
to turn it over to the sheriff upon demand, and whether there is any
of Aug. 4, 1972, ch. 550, §§ 9-11, [19721 Cal. Stat. 944-45 (repealed 1974) (upon ex
parte application of creditor establishing prima facie case for issuance of writ of attach-
ment, court would issue to debtor both notice of hearing and temporary restraining
order).
Most existing statutes provide that the judgment and the levy of a writ of execution
give rise to liens in favor of the judgment creditor. See note 16 supra. A lien tends
to protect the judgment creditor against a subsequent disposition by the judgment debtor.
But unless the sheriff has seized the asset, a lien is inadequate because the debtor might
still dispose of or secrete the property in such a way that the creditor is unable to locate
it. The existence of disclosure proceedings may not be sufficient to enable the creditor
to locate the property. For example, in State ex rel. Howard v. Allison, 431 S.W.2d
233 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968), the court upheld a judgment debtor's refusal to answer ques-
tions at the disclosure proceedings on grounds of self-incrimination. The incrimination
might be with respect to statutes that make fraudulent conveyances or income tax eva-
sion criminal offenses.
For discussion of the constitutionality of injunctions obtained ex parte, see Rendle-
man, supra note 82, at 584-89; Rendleman, Toward Due Process in Injunction Proce-
dure, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 221.
219. It is, of course, possible that the judgment debtor would sell the asset for less
than its fair market value, in which event turning over the proceeds would not be the
same as turning over, the asset. On the other hand, even when the sheriff obtains and
sells property, the proceeds at the sheriff's sale are not likely to be the fair market value
of the property. Of course, there is no necessary relationship between the amount the
judgment debtor might receive for his contemptuous sale and the amount the sheriff
would receive at the execution sale.
220. See Vail v. Quinlan, 406 F. Supp. 951, 959 n.19, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (three.
judge court) (before incarceration, judgment debtor who failed to appear at contempt
hearing must be brought before a judge and, if indigent, provided counsel).
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excuse (such as destruction of the asset) for his failure to turn it
over. 221  Since the great majority of judgment debtors presumably
would obey the injunction, the burden of contempt proceedings should
not be a factor in any significant percentage of cases.
Notice is already the method of levying on certain kinds of property,
most notably realty.2 2  There is, of course, no concern that the judg-
ment debtor will conceal real property. But he may dispose of it, and
some statutes minimize this risk by authorizing an appropriate entry in
the title records.122  A state could take a similar approach for any other
kind of property for which there is a recording system, for example,
automobiles in those states that have a filing system instead of a title
certificate system. But even if the judgment debtor could not offi-
cially transfer the title, he might still be able to find a person willing
to buy the car.224 Consequently, if levy by notation in the central
records is adopted for any personal property, the judgment debtor
should be served with the proposed notice of levy and its accompany-
ing injunction.
For property that is covered by a certificate of title, such as automo-
biles in most states, levy could consist of seizing the title certificate
rather than the asset and ordering the judgment debtor not to conceal
or dispose of the asset. To compel surrender of the certificate, the stat-
ute could authorize the sheriff to take and retain possession of the asset
itself until he receives the certificate, at which time the judgment
debtor would regain possession. If reasonable demand for the certifi-
cate, made personally on the judgment debtor, precedes seizure of the
asset, this approach is not objectionable. But if seizure is permitted,
for example, when the judgment debtor is not at home or when he is
unable to procure the certificate, then there is a taking, albeit of
short duration, before any opportunity for a hearing.225
221. There would be some risk that the judgment debtor will falsely claim that the
asset has been stolen or destroyed. Although some persons might be willing to commit
perjury, the execution statutes should not be constructed on the assumption of perjury.
222. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 688(b) (Deering Supp. 1975):
To levy upon any property.., which is subject to execution but for which
a method of levy... is not provided, the levying officer shall serve upon the
person in possession of such property... (1) a copy of the writ of execution
and (2) a notice that such property . . . is levied upon in pursuance of such
writ.
223. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 77, § 1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975) (judgment lien from
time copy of judgment is filed with recorder of deeds in county where land is located).
224. For example, there might arise a black market in such cars.
225. An alternative to levy by notice that might be thought to meet both the due
925
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The statutes should also specify the procedure for determining
whether the judgment debtor is entitled to claim the asset as exempt.
An opportunity for some form of hearing is necessary, but the hearing
could be either automatic or only at the request of the parties. If a
hearing were required in every case, the statutes could require the writ
of execution to state the date on which the hearing would occur. An
automatic hearing is probably undesirable, however, because of the dif-
ficulty in coordinating the actions of the clerk and the sheriff. The
hearing should occur shortly after levy, but when the clerk issues the
writ, no one knows how soon the sheriff will be able to effect levy. Of
course, it would be possible to provide for a hearing, say, ten days after
the levy22 6 and to require the sheriff immediately after levy to return
the writ to the clerk, who would place the matter on the court's docket.
Nevertheless, even if it is possible to work out the mechanics for mak-
ing the hearing follow the levy automatically, it is unwise to do so.
Many debtors will not take advantage of the hearing: some will not
be entitled to claim the property as exempt, and others will not wish
to claim an exemption even if available.22r Setting the matter down
for a hearing in these cases would be wasteful for the court and also
for the creditor, who would probably have an attorney present at the
hearing. On the other side of the coin, when the judgment debtor does
process and the policy problems presented by existing statutes is to provide notice in
the judgment itself. Cf. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 412.20 (Deering Supp. 1975) (initial
summons contains warning that wages, money, or property may be taken). Indeed, En-
dicott may be read as holding that the judgment provides the judgment debtor with the
necessary notice. If so, then arguably all that is necessary is to revise the statutes pro-
viding for notice of the judgment to provide also notice that the judgment creditor may
procure seizure of the judgment debtor's assets, that the debtor may be entitled to speci-
fied exemptions, and that the debtor may continue in undisturbed possession by filing
a claim with the sheriff. Cf. Phillips v. Bartolomie, 46 Cal. App. 3d 346, 354, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 56, 62 (1975). Even if constitutional, however, this approach is unwise. The
judgment creditor is under no obligation to enforce his judgment immediately. It is
likely, therefore, that some assets claimed as exempt at the time judgment is rendered
would be worn out and replaced before the judgment creditor seeks to enforce his judg-
ment. The judgment debtor would be obliged to file new claims of exemption, over a
twenty-year period in some states, every time he replaced or acquired an exempt asset.
Moreover, this alternative would impose on the sheriff a substantial burden of record
keeping.
226. Cf. Law of March 14, 1973, ch. 8, § 2, [1973] Cal. Stat. 15-16 (repealed 1974)
(hearing 10-30 days after issuance of writ of attachment).
227. If, for example, the statute exempted $400 worth of household furnishings, a
judgment debtor might not claim his television as exempt so that he could instead protect
his refrigerator (or vice versa). Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92-93 n.29 (1972).
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claim the asset to be exempt, some creditors will acquiesce in the
debtor's claim of exemption, making an automatic hearing wasteful for
the court and the judgment debtor.
Consequently, the statute should provide for a hearing only if the
parties request it. At the time of levy, the judgment debtor should be
informed that he may be entitled to claim exemptions, which should
be listed in the writ of execution,"2 8 and that he must claim them within
a specified period of time after the date of levy.229  If he fails to claim
them within that time, the sheriff would take possession of the asset
and proceed to advertise and sell it.230 If the debtor does file a claim
of exemption, the judgment creditor would have a specified period in
which to file an objection to the claim.2"- If the creditor fails to file
an objection within the specified time, the sheriff would notify the judg-
ment debtor that the levy has been abandoned and that he no longer
is subject to the order not to dispose of the property. If the creditor
does file a timely objection, he should be required to request the court
to schedule a hearing to determine if the judgment debtor is entitled
to the claimed exemption.282  The court's attention, then, would be
brought to the matter only when the debtor claims an exemption and
the creditor objects to the claim. To minimize the delay for the credi-
tor and the restraint on the debtor's power to dispose of the property,
the hearing should be held shortly after the creditor objects. 3
A notice of levy containing the above requirements might be as
follows:
228. Cf. Mo. R. Civ. P. 76.08 (before levy sheriff shall inform judgment debtor of
statutory exemptions).
229. A reasonably short period, such as seven to ten days, should suffice.
230. Failure to claim an exemption within the specified period should not constitute
a waiver of the exemption. It should, however, waive the judgment debtor's right to
retain the asset until the exemption is allowed. Since he has been given notice, there
is no objection to this taking. But see D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174,
185 (1972) (possibility that the standard for waiver of constitutional rights in civil cases
is the same as in criminal cases-voluntary, knowing and intelligently made).
231. An even shorter period, such as five to seven days after the debtor files his
claim, is appropriate because the judgment creditor has an opportunity to assess the situ-
ation before procuring levy.
232. Since the positions of the parties are fixed by the time the creditor files his ob-
jection, the creditor should be required to seek the hearing very promptly, say within
three days after notifying the sheriff of his objection to the debtor's claim.
233. Thus, a requirement that the court schedule the hearing for 15-30 days from
the date of the creditor's request would be reasonable. The debtor, of course, should
be provided with notice of the hearing.
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To satisfy a judgment duly rendered against you on (date)
in favor of (judgment creditor) in the amount of
(amount of judgment) , I hereby levy on the following property:
(description of property levied upon)
DO NOT CONCEAL, DAMAGE, OR DISPOSE OF THIS
PROPERTY IN ANY WAY
DO NOT USE THIS PROPERTY AS COLLATERAL
IN CONNECTION WITH ANY EXTENSION OF CREDIT
You may be entitled to claim this property as exempt from
execution if it falls within one or more of the following categories of
property:
(list of all exempt property)
If you do not claim this property as exempt, the sheriff or his
deputy will return to take it.
If you wish to claim this property as exempt, you must complete
and return the attached "Claim of Exemption" form on or before
(date ten days after date of levy) . If (judgment creditor)
wishes to contest your claim of exemption, he must do so within seven
days after your claim of exemption is returned to the sheriff, and you
will be notified of the date on which a hearing will be held to de-
termine whether you are entitled to keep the property as exempt.
IF YOU CONCEAL, DAMAGE, ENCUMBER, OR DIS-
POSE OF THIS PROPERTY, YOU WILL BE SUB-
JECT TO PUNISHMENT FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT,
INCLUDING A FINE AND/OR IMPRISONMENT 23 4
234. Compare the position taken by a committee of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Uniform Exemptions Act §§ 8(a), (b) (Tent.
Draft No. 5, April 1, 1976), exempts household furnishings and appliances, clothing,
tools of the trade, and several other kinds of property, up to stated maximum values.
Sections 8(c), (d) require notice to a judgment debtor before a judgment creditor may
obtain levy on property of the kind enumerated in §§ 8(a), (b). The judgment creditor
first must apply to the court for an order informing the judgment debtor that the creditor
seeks levy. The creditor's application must state that he has reason to believe that the
debtor has nonexempt property of the kind listed above, must identify the property, and
must set forth the "facts constituting the basis for his belief that the property is not ex-
[Vol. 1975:877
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At the hearing23 5 the burden of asserting that the property is exempt
might be placed on the judgment debtor, or alternatively, the burden
of asserting that the property is subject to execution might be placed
on the judgment creditor. Similarly, the risk of nonpersuasion might
be placed on either party. In Raigoza v. Sperl, the court stated: "It
is eminently reasonable to place the burden of applying for and prov-
ing that the [property is] exempt on the debtor . . . . Surely he is
in a better position to prove [that he is entitled to an exemption] than
the creditor is to disprove it."'238  The court in Brown v. Liberty Loan
empt." Id. § 8(c) (i). If the court grants the judgment creditor's request, the court in-
forms the judgment debtor of the creditor's claimed right to levy, gives him up to 15
days to object, and enjoins him from "removing, encumbering, damaging, or disposing
of any property of the kind listed" above. Id. § 8(d). If the judgment debtor objects
to levy and claims the property to be exempt, the judgment creditor may contest the
claim of exemption, and the court will resolve the dispute. Id. §§ 8(f), 14(e).
For all property other than the kinds listed in §§ 8(a), (b), the Act requires no prior
notice of levy. Id. § 14(a). Instead, within three days after levy, the judgment creditor
must give notice of the levy and of the judgment debtor's right to claim exemptions. Id.
If 14(c), 15.
235. Ultimately, the judgment debtor must be afforded a full adversary hearing on
the question whether the property is exempt. But the state could, if it wished, provide
an expedited initial hearing to determine if there is a probability that the judgment cred-
itor will prevail, in which case the judgment debtor should not be allowed to continue
in possession of the asset pending final resolution of the controversy. On numerous oc-
casions, courts have indicated approval of temporary deprivations resulting from hearings
that did not entail the full panoply of due process rights. E.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 96
S. Ct. 893 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (notice and opportunity
to present evidence before deprivation of prisoner's good time credit, but no right to
counsel or cross examination); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (notice and
opportunity to state objections, but no formal hearing before discharge from employ-
ment); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (hearing to determine whether there is rea-
sonable possibility of judgment against licensee before driver's license can be suspended
for failure to have insurance or post bond); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S.
337 (1969) (hearing to establish at least probable validity of underlying claim before
prejudgment garnishment of wages); United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y.
State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated as moot sub nom. Regan v.
Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974) (parole board must give reasons for denial of parole,
but prisoner has no right of counsel or cross examination at the parole hearing); Torres
v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 321 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated and remanded,
402 U.S. 968, adhered to on remand, 333 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), affd mem.,
405 U.S. 949 (1972) (notice and opportunity to object before suspension of unemploy-
ment compensation, but no hearing). The expedited hearing could be conducted by a
judge or possibly by some other officer of the court. See note 49 supra. This approach
would add another layer of decision to the process, which would probably increase the
costs and delay the ultimate decision. Since it is in the interest of both parties to resolve
the dispute as soon as possible, no very useful purpose is served by providing both an
expedited probable cause hearing and then a full hearing shortly thereafter.
236. Raigoza v. Sperl, 34 Cal. App. 3d 560, 568, 110 Cal. Rptr. 296, 302 (1973)
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Corp., however, disagreed: "The Raigoza court seems to have imper-
missibly shifted the burden of proof from the 'taker' to the one whose
property is to be taken. ' 2 7  Since allocation of the burden of proof
probably is not a constitutional problem in this context,28 8 the legisla-
ture has the freedom to select the view of either Raigoza or Brown.
Arguably the statute should contain some sanction to deter judgment
debtors from making unfounded claims of exemption and to deter
judgment creditors from making unfounded objections to exemption
claims.239 The court's power to tax costs on the losing party may have
this deterrent effect. Any further sanction, however, should be carefully
circumscribed to prevent overdeterrence-for example, deterring judg-
ment creditors from seeking levy in the first place or deterring
judgment debtors from claiming lawful exemptions. Probably the sanc-
tion should be no more than giving the court the power to award attor-
(footnote omitted); accord, Phillips v. Bartolomie, 46 Cal. App. 3d 346, 121 Cal. Rptr.
56 (1975).
237. Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., 392 F. Supp. 1023, 1038 (M.D. Fla. 1974). In
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), the statute upheld by the Court placed
the burden of proof on the creditor. In Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp.
643, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (three-judge court), remanded with directions to abstain sub
nom. Carey v. Sugar, 96 S. Ct. 1208 (1976), one of the reasons the court held the New
York attachment statute unconstitutional was that the statute placed the burden of proof
on the debtor. See Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1130 (3d Cir.
1976). In two concurring opinions, Justice Powell has stated that one of the fea-
tures of a constitutional prejudgment seizure statute would be the allocation of the
burden of proof to the creditor. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S.
601, 611-12 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 625 (1974). Eighty
years ago, the Supreme Court of Maine referred to
the fundamental juristic principle of procedure ...that the claimant, not the
defendant, shall resort to judicial process; that he who asserts something to
be due him, not he who denies a debt, shall have the burden of judicial action
and proof.
Wood v. City of Auburn, 87 Me. 287, 293, 32 A. 906, 908 (1895).
238. Compare Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607, 613 (1962) with Speiser
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) and Western & Atl. RR. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639
(1929).
239. In Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., 392 F. Supp. 1023, 1033 (M.D. Fla. 1974),
the court suggested that a judgment creditor may object to the judgment debtor's claim
of exemption even though the creditor knows the debtor qualifies for it under the stat-
ute. Indeed, the opinion as originally issued contained the following sentence:
In this regard, it should be noted that counsel for defendant Liberty Loan can-
didly admitted that agents of Liberty Loan may well have had knowledge that
the named plaintiff was the head of a household and therefore that she was
entitled to an exemption under Fla. Stat. § 222.12 when the motion for garnish-
ment was filed.
Civil No. 73-631, at 11 (Nov. 25, 1974). The opinion as finally amended, however,
omitted this sentence. 392 F. Supp. at 1032.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/1
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neys fees to the prevailing party if it appears to the court that the claim
or objection of the other party was not asserted in good faith.
Existing legislation governing executions and exemptions unduly
favors the judgment creditor's interest at the expense of the interest
of the judgment debtor. It also presents serious constitutional ques-
tions. This proposal satisfies due process of law, and it also effectu-
ates the legislative policy of preserving exempt property for the judg-
ment debtor. Above all, it achieves these objectives without sacrificing
the judgment creditor's interest in obtaining satisfaction of his judgment.
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